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Abstract
The following paper examines the relationship between Populism and Neoliberalism in the
early 21st century in the U.S. Through the lens of a historical-structural analysis, it tests the
hypothesis set forth by authors David Harvey, Dawson Barrett, and John B. Judis that the
prominence of Populism in the 2016 election cycle could not be explained without the phenomenon
of Neoliberalism in the U.S. To accomplish this, it examines the rise of income inequality and
Neoliberal globalization and uses statistical and polling data to determine whether these variables
were related to Neoliberalism and whether voters reacted to them in 2016. It further examines the
issues espoused by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders and looks at polling data to determine the
beliefs of their supporters. By categorizing Bernie Sanders as an anti-Capitalist and Donald
Trump as an anti-Globalist Populist, it sets up an empirical test to determine whether their
supporters were primed for these Populist arguments. In finding that their supporters were indeed
especially primed for these arguments and further finding that these rhetorical styles were linked
to Neoliberalism via their opposition to the issues of income inequality and Neoliberal
globalization – policy positions which are coded in this paper as anti-Neoliberal - this paper comes
to the conclusion that the hypothesis that Neoliberalism provided a unique rhetorical catalyst for
Populists to exploit is supported.
Executive Summary
My thesis project, entitled “Neoliberalism: A Populist Crisis of Conscience for America”,
is a Political Science research paper that is focused on understanding why Populists like Donald
Trump and Bernie Sanders experienced such widespread support and success in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. It focuses on testing the hypothesis, as outlined by scholars David Harvey,
Dawson Barrettt, and John B. Judis, who have written on this topic before me, that it is the policies
and consequences of the doctrine of Neoliberalism that created one fertile rhetorical ground for
those Populists to exploit. Briefly, a Populist is a political actor who employs the narrative
framework of Populism to win popular support in an election. Populism is a malleable narrative
that focuses on a telling of the story of politics that pits “the people” (as defined by the Populist)
against “the elite”, who the Populist casts as having created a crisis (or profited off of or done
nothing in response to a crisis) that in some way hurts or oppresses “the people”. Neoliberalism is
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a political and economic doctrine of thought, colloquially known as “Reaganomics” or “trickledown economics” that prizes individual freedoms above all else. It takes the view that the market
is the ultimate tool for humankind and works to ensure market freedoms through the deregulation
of industries and the movement of capital and the privatization of as much of the economy as is
feasible.
Throughout the paper, I employ a few steps to ascertain a rigorous empirical test for the
hypothesis set forth. First, I break down the hypothesis into the assumption that, if Neoliberalism
can be correlated to the rise and success of Populism, then the best way to observe that would be
to look at trends in public opinion data to determine whether “anti-Neoliberal sentiment” has been
trending upward over the years that the doctrine has been in place. I further assume that any polling
done specifically on ‘Neoliberalism’ would be faulty data, as it is a technical Political Science term
that few outside the world of Political Science would be able to grasp completely. Instead of
looking for public opinion data on that specific topic, then, I decided to break down “antiNeoliberal sentiment” into trends in opinion regarding two key issues related to Neoliberalism: the
rise in income inequality and issues related to globalization such as immigration, trade and
outsourcing, and the U.S.’s role on the global stage. By coding anti-Neoliberal sentiment in this
way, I could look at more reliable public opinion data and, taking the view that the ideology equals
the sum of its parts and consequences in the public eye, provide a more definitive answer as to the
question of how/ whether voters have responded to the issues posed by the rise of Neoliberalism.
When I broke down anti-Neoliberal sentiment into these variables, I was able to find growing
concern regarding the issue of income inequality and growing isolationist and nationalist views
amongst the electorate. This supported the hypothesis that anti-Neoliberal sentiment has been
growing over the years that the doctrine has been in place.
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To connect this rise in anti-Neoliberal sentiment to the rise of Populism, though, requires
an additional step. The way that I chose to examine the connection was by looking at the rhetoric
of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump and looking at the beliefs of their supporters to determine
whether they had especially potent reactions to the variables examined. To do this, I defined Bernie
Sanders as an anti-Capitalist Populist who was focused on Economic Populism and railed against
Capitalism in his rhetoric. I defined Donald Trump as an anti-Globalist Populist, who employed
nationalistic and nativist rhetoric to appeal to fears about immigration and diversity. With those
definitions in place, I was able to look for those similar beliefs among the bases of support for each
candidate. I found that their supporters did indeed react strongly to the issues of income inequality
and globalism respectively, but I wanted to be especially sure that the opinion data was valid.
Studies have shown that voters, especially when they are uneducated on specific issues, tend to
assume the views of the party elite that they follow. That means that public opinion data might not
necessarily be representative of those voters’ views as much as it was representative of the views
of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. To be sure that it was representative of the views of voters,
then, I set up one more test. I looked at the demographic breakdowns of the bases of support for
each candidate and looked for standout traits. Among both bases of support, age was the defining
factor: for Sanders, it was the votes of the youth, and for Trump, it was the votes of older voters. I
then found studies showing that younger voters have increasingly negative views of Capitalism
and increasingly positive views of Socialism, suggesting that Bernie Sanders’ base of support was,
in fact, looking for a candidate espousing anti-Capitalist rhetoric and not just adopting the views
of a party leader. Similarly, I found studies linking aging to feelings of nationalism and
isolationism, suggesting that Donald Trump’s base was primed for anti-Globalist rhetoric. These
findings, combined with the polling data I examined, showed clearly that the supporters of each
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candidate were reacting strongly to the variables of income inequality and globalism, reactions
that I had coded as anti-Neoliberal in nature. These findings meant that the hypothesis was
supported, and it appears as though Neoliberalism was a key factor in the success of Populists in
2016.
The significance of this project lies mostly in the argument that Populism, in modern
democracies, is a useful tool for identifying problems that the citizens of a democracy might have.
Populism, as laid out in the definition, is an indication of a crisis or perceived crisis in society that
citizens want tended to. When Populists enjoy success, it is because the political elite is
unresponsive to those concerns. When Populists come along, then, it is important to understand
why in order to root out the crisis that led to the rise of the Populist. By testing the relationship
between the rise of Neoliberalism and Populism, I was working to see whether Neoliberalism was
a crisis (or perceived crisis) that people were reacting to. The success of the hypothesis means that
we must at least have an honest conversation about why it may have led to such a strong reaction.
Understanding Populism can help us understand the undercurrents of political support and can
provide us with the tools to determine how to fix our trajectory. The work of this project suggests
that a conversation needs to be had about the place of Neoliberalism within our society. It does not
help to ignore the catalysts for Populists, instead choosing to focus simply on counteracting and
removing the Populist. Counteracting Populism means targeting its catalysts. This project should
help us do that.
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Introduction
What explains the rise and prevalence of Populism in the U.S. in 2016? In this project, I
examine the hypothesis set forth by scholars David Harvey, Dawson Barrett, and John B. Judis
that Populism in 2016 was, in part, the culmination of a reaction against the policies and
consequences of Neoliberalism. Specifically, this project provides a plausibility test for the
question of whether the Neoliberal agenda, and the policies associated with it, helped paved the
way for Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders to campaign with credible Populist messages.
While the focus of this project is on Neoliberalism, I recognize that there are many
contextual factors that need to be explained in order to present an intellectually honest conclusion.
As such, I have decided to include a discussion of the ethno-cultural elements that have helped to
shape our modern world, especially as they pertain to race and religion. This section, “The Context
for a Neoliberal World”, follows the section “Defining Populism”. I feel that this discussion will
provide context and nuance that will make the conclusion I arrive at after testing the hypothesis
set forth by Harvey, Barrett, and Judis more compelling.
In my thesis, I explore the relationship between Neoliberalism and Populism through the
lens of a historical analysis. Briefly, by referring to “Populism”, I mean what Michael Kazin refers
to as “a flexible mode of persuasion”. It is a way of telling the story of politics that focuses on
pitting “the people” against “the elite”. Populism is a highly amorphous concept, but in this project,
I focus on two strains: Bernie Sanders’ anti-Capitalist Economic Populism and Donald Trump’s
anti-Globalist Political Populism. I examine Neoliberalism as the catalyst for Populist expressions
in America through its direct and indirect impact on American politics. I work to test this
relationship by connecting Neoliberalism to the two major variables I am examining (income
inequality and the impact of Neoliberal globalization on immigration and related variables) and
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relating the rise and messages of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump to these variables. I do this
by examining how (and if) the candidacies of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump tailored their
campaigns to these variables. I use public opinion data to examine general trends over the years
and specific attitudes among the supporters of such movements to ascertain an empirical
connection between upwardly trending feelings of anti-Neoliberal sentiment (as defined by
opposition to the two main variables examined) and the rise of Populism as a response.
This project primarily builds on the works of Dawson Barrett’s The Defiant: Protest
Movements in Post-Liberal America, which documents various protests that have arisen over the
years in response to Neoliberalism and examines their messages; John B. Judis’ The Populist
Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European politics, which
highlights global trends in the rise in Populism and relates them to Neoliberal policies; and David
Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism, which documents the what, how, and why of
Neoliberalism and juxtaposes the goals and values of Neoliberal reformers to actual global trends.
I also utilize Eric J. Oliver and Wendy M. Rahn’s scholarly article Rise of the Trumpenvolk for an
analysis of Populism among the candidates and 2016 and data collected from other sources to
comment on and augment their arguments. I use a myriad of other books and sources for various
reasons, but it is primarily the conversation that these books and this article have generated that
this paper seeks to comment on.
The purpose of this project is multifaceted. In the first sense, it exists to explain the success
of Populists in 2016. Additionally, my work focuses in on the Populist reaction in 2016, but takes
the view that Populism is symptomatic and indicative of a larger problem. In my definition of
Populism, I include reference to the idea that a Populist message inherently latches on to a crisis
or perceived crisis for credibility. The presence of Populism, then, can be a good indicator of policy
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failure. The sweeping success of Populists, as seen in the election of Donald Trump, suggests that
that crisis and policy failure must have been rather serious. This paper attempts to test the
connection between Neoliberalism and Populism to see if it can be understood as a systemic cause
of the crisis/ crises that Populists exploited. Any reader should understand it in this context; this
paper seeks to root out a malady, taking the view that Populism indicates such a presence, and
comment on what may be done about it.
Before beginning my analysis, I need to address other elements in the rise of Populism that
have garnered much attention. I believe, for example, that the advent of “fake news” helped to play
a role in the rise and success of Populism. The story of Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump would
be incomplete without information on Cambridge Analytica and the related Russian interference.
These elements complicate the picture. That said, numerous scholars, including the well-regarded
statistician Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight.com, have indicated the trickiness of discerning just
how much Russian interference mattered1. I believe that these issues need to be considered as
factors in the rise of Populism, but not as the primary systemic impetus driving it. Additionally,
understand that I treat Neoliberalism as a piece of a larger puzzle. A thesis of this size could not
possibly comprehensively consider all the interrelated elements in the rise of Populism. As such,
I make brief note here to acknowledge other factors, but do not consider them in greater detail,
instead choosing to focus on examining the variable of Neoliberalism.
In my paper, I find through a historical-structural analysis that there is a relationship
between Neoliberalism and the two key variables that I am examining for their relation to antiNeoliberal sentiment (income inequality and Neoliberal globalization). Individually, I find that

And several studies, as indicated in the New York Times article “Fake News and Bots May Be Worrisome, but
Their Political Power Is Overblown”, have shown that fake news really isn’t that significant a factor in swinging
elections.
1
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there is no noticeable difference between sentiment toward income inequality at the start of
measurement and the modern day. When examining more specific polls, however, like those
focusing on attitudes toward raising the minimum wage and attitudes toward the amount of profit
that large corporations make, there does appear to be a growing dissatisfaction with the state of
income inequality in the U.S. On the issue of globalization and immigration, an upward trend in
feelings that offshoring is a major problem and an upward trend in isolationist sentiment suggest
a negative reaction to this consequence of Neoliberalism. Upward trends in nativism, especially
among right-wing voters, also suggest that this issue was a key one for Populists to exploit.
These trends provide the basis for understanding Populism in 2016 as a reaction to rising
anti-Neoliberal sentiment. Examining the views of the supporters of Bernie Sanders and Donald
Trump provides the final empirical test for whether voters actually reacted to these issues. By
examining demographic data, and finding that the key defining factor of Sanders’ and Trump’s
bases was age – youth support and the support of 65+ voters for Sanders and Trump respectively
– and linking that demographic factor to the traits of an electorate especially primed for antiCapitalist and anti-Globalist Populism, I come to the conclusion that Sanders and Trump both did
indeed exploit bases especially primed for anti-Neoliberal messaging and effectively find that the
contention that Neoliberalism created did provide a ‘crisis’ for Populists to exploit.

Methods
In designing this paper, the argumentation that I have put forth relies primarily on a robust
historical-structural analysis supplemented by demographic and polling data. This process has
meant the compilation of works across the spectrum of political science, political philosophy, and
political theory in order to best provide a working theory that might to explain the world around
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us in the most robust way possible. I have relied on the exhaustive work of scholars like David
Harvey, Michael Kazin, John B. Judis, and Dawson Barrett to call upon implicit historical
arguments rather than compiling a historical tome myself. I take their work and supplement it with
polling data while also using other books and scholarly papers to cross-reference and check their
theories. Where appropriate, I point out the flaws in their texts and utilize other sources to fill those
gaps. I treat their works as primarily a basis for the historical argument in this paper, but I do refer
to the theories and analysis that they posit where appropriate. I do this so that I can help to ensure
that I am mostly relying on their work for the empirical and objective effort that they put forward
(such as Harvey’s examination of global GDP before and after Neoliberalism), leaving most of the
analysis and synthesis to my own work. I also do this to link the two ideas into the 21st century.
Finally, I try to link claims about popular protest movements and shifting national opinion to
polling data from sources like Gallup, Pew Research Center, American National Election Studies,
Public Religion Research Institute, and others. I do this to make the established hypothesis
falsifiable.
In this paper, I have designed the first empirical test in a way that may be confusing to
some. Logically, to connect Neoliberalism to Populism, it might make sense to try to trend feelings
of resentment toward Neoliberalism, considered here to be anti-Neoliberal sentiment. In reality, it
is implausible to think that such polling data asking voters to explicitly outline their feelings toward
Neoliberalism would be useful. Neoliberalism is a complex and barely understood term, and
polling voters for their feelings about complex Political Science jargon would be fruitless. Instead,
I take the view that the best way to see if there is a connection between Populism and Neoliberalism
would be to take the view that Neoliberalism can be equated to the sum of its parts: if it can be
shown, through a historical-structural analysis, that Neoliberalism is responsible for major ‘crises’
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in our society that Populists have undertaken as issues for their platform, then examining voter
opinion regarding those crises should logically show an empirical relationship between
Neoliberalism and the rise of Populism. As such, I have outlined two separate variables and
consider them to be the ‘crises’ worthy of a Populist message. Those issues are as follows: income
inequality and Neoliberal globalization and trade and issues related to immigration (which, as the
historical analysis illustrates, are all interconnected issues).

Defining Neoliberalism
The Promise
According to noted Political Philosopher David Harvey’s work A Brief History of
Neoliberalism,
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private
property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. (Harvey 2)
As Harvey notes, Neoliberalism’s guiding philosophy lies in the belief that markets should
represent the primary governing force for all aspects of modern society. As such, Neoliberalism is
concerned with practices of deregulation and privatization in the name of “freeing” markets from
government intervention. If a market doesn’t exist in a particular area, Neoliberals will argue that
one should and must be created.
Under Neoliberal tenets, the state is severely limited and reduced mostly to the role of
maintaining the value of currency. Beyond this capacity, the state is also responsible for
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establishing a military for the purposes of procuring and maintaining markets2. The state largely
acts as a policing force, deregulating and privatizing industries to get out of the way of the
mechanisms of the market. There is an inherent tension between the principles of Neoliberalism
and the intermingling of the state and economic/ corporatist actors that will be addressed, but for
now, I am laying out the theoretical model and the ideology of Neoliberalism in order to establish
a coherent framework that I can comment on and refer to.
Historically, Neoliberalism’s main proponents have been philosophers and economists like
Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. There have also been many prominent political actors who
have espoused Neoliberal values. The early adopters - and perhaps best-known political
proponents - were President Ronald Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher in the United Kingdom. In the U.S., the practice came to be colloquially known as
“Reaganomics” or “Trickle-Down Economics”. In Europe3 and the U.K., the practice has mostly
been known as “The Third Way”.
There are several main components that David Harvey considers in laying out the
theoretical framework for Neoliberal states. Neoliberal states tend to favor strong individual
property rights, the rule of law, and institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade, as
“these are the institutional arrangements considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms”
(Harvey 64). Neoliberal proponents also believe in a legal framework governed by “freely
negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace” (Harvey 64).

This will be addressed in greater detail later, but for now, the U.S.’s military conquests (specifically the wars in
Vietnam and Iraq) over the last several decades provide a good example of a state employing a military with
economic goals in mind.
3
Other experiments with Neoliberalism occurred in countries like Germany and, as will be discussed momentarily,
the European Union (along with the United Nations and other international governing bodies) arose on the heels of
Neoliberal thought.
2
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The freedom of businesses and corporations to operate within the national framework is
understood as a fundamental good, as “private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen as
the keys to innovation and wealth creation” (Harvey 64). Neoliberals focus on continuous
increases in productivity which are expected to deliver higher living standards for everyone (this
is commonly understood in the phrase “a rising tide will lift all boats” which presumes that the
elimination of poverty can best be achieved through free markets and free trade). Above all,
Neoliberalism prizes “individual liberty”, a value that is presumed to be achievable only through
truly free market interactions.
From a policy perspective, these values mean a major focus on the privatization and
deregulation of industries. The primary claim here is that the combination of privatization,
deregulation, and competition serves to “eliminate bureaucratic red tape”, increasing efficiency
and productivity, improving the quality of goods and services, and reducing costs to consumers
(Harvey 65). As such, the Neoliberal state is in perpetual motion, constantly reorganizing itself
and seeking new institutional arrangements that improve its competitiveness on the global market.
Freedom of competition is not the only guiding policy principle, however. More than
anything, a focus on individual freedoms is central to Neoliberal thought. Harvey outlines how
this extends to Neoliberal policy creation by explaining that freedoms are preserved in the market,
but individuals are held accountable for their own actions outside of the protections granted to
those participating in the market (Harvey 65-66). He argues that “This principle extends into the
realms of welfare, education, health care, and even pensions… Individual success or failure are
interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings… rather than being attributed to
any systemic property (Harvey 65-66).
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In a Neoliberal system, the market is the final arbiter. It guarantees individual freedoms
and individual rights and is believed to do so in the most democratic and fair way possible. It is
this line of thinking that guides Neoliberal policymaking, and it is the reliance on the market that
explains the preference to defer to markets in all decision-making matters.
Finally, in a Neoliberal system, “The free mobility of capital between sectors, regions, and
countries is regarded as critical” (Harvey 65). Neoliberals prize global and international
competition, taking the somewhat radical view that state sovereignty should be subordinate to the
global market4. As such, Neoliberals believe that any barriers to free trade and competition should
be eliminated and markets can and should be established wherever possible. As a result of these
beliefs, Neoliberals tend to favor Technocracy (government controlled by technical experts) or
Plutocracy (government controlled by the wealthy) to Democracy, taking the view that the people
cannot be entrusted with the preservation of markets.
The Reality: Neoliberalization in Practice
Most who are familiar with Political Science and Political Theory will recognize the reality
that any ideology is different in theory and practice. Neoliberalism is no exception to that rule.
A Neoliberal state needs to create a good business and investment culture for capitalistic
endeavors in order to thrive. The implementation of that culture carries with it a number of biases,
however. Most Neoliberals tend to favor the freedoms of corporations while treating labor and the
environment as commodities. Neoliberals tend to favor the integrity of the financial system and
the solvency of financial institutions over the well-being of the population or environmental quality

4

A philosophy that many Populists, especially throughout Europe, have been highly critical of. For example, the
“Brexit” movement in the U.K. and Marine Le Pen’s rise in France highlight the tension that this belief creates.
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in cases of conflict (Harvey 70-71). Neoliberals are always opportunistically seeking markets and
advantages, usually at the expense of ideological consistency. Nowhere is this concept more
pronounced than in the authoritarian reach of the military arm of Neoliberal economies.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq illustrates this point. When the U.S. occupied Iraq, one of the
first moves was to establish free markets in all areas of the economy and eliminate trade barriers
(Harvey 6). In the process, they established a Neoliberal state. Harvey argues that “according to
neoliberal theory, the sorts of measures that [U.S. Diplomat Paul Bremer] outlined were both
necessary and sufficient for the creation of wealth and therefore for the improved well-being of
the population at large. The assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the
market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking” (Harvey 7). In reality, the creation
of a Neoliberal state established freedoms for corporations but tread on the autonomy of the
citizens of Iraq.
The reach of the U.S.’s military arm highlights a key aspect of Neoliberalization: Capitalist
globalization5. Here, I define the process of Neoliberalization broadly. This concept contains the
notion of the expansion of the Neoliberal state at home through domestic policies and also the
expansion of the state abroad in the form of openness to trade and investment and the reaction to
flows of people6. Since Neoliberalism is about the belief that markets will maximize welfare and
allocate resources efficiently, free trade is an integral part of the Neoliberalization process. Thus,
Neoliberalization necessarily has a global dimension. Through Neoliberalization, an integrated
global economy is formed through the interrelated elements of immigration, trade, and investment.

5

For further, more detailed reading, please consult Mark Rupert’s Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions
of a New World Order and Manfred B. Steger’s Globalism: The New Market Ideology
6
By the “reaction to flows of people”, I mean the degree to which a society accepts the influx of a certain people.
As the U.S. tightened security at the Southern border in the 1990s, it also welcomed tech entrepreneurs and “highskill” workers from around the world to help build its burgeoning tech empire.
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Because of these disparate elements, backlash against globalization (and hence, backlash against
Neoliberalism) can foment as either anti-immigrant or anti-trade sentiment. In relation to the war
in Iraq, the U.S.’s military arm represents the global reach and influence of the U.S.’s Neoliberal
state. Any actions undertaken in the war are intrinsically tied to the expansion of the U.S.’s
Neoliberal influence exactly because of the U.S.’s intention to create free markets to trade with
and invest in. In this way, Harvey, Barrett, and Judis see backlash against such actions as indirectly
providing a criticism of Neoliberalism. Anti-globalization and anti-Neoliberal criticism are
inherently somewhat isolationist, then, because the doctrine of Neoliberalism places an onus on
market expansion through any means necessary (Harvey 7). In the case of Iraq, those means were
the force of a violent occupation. David Harvey takes a particularly critical view of this practice
of Neoliberalization:
We can, therefore, interpret neoliberalization either as a utopian project to realize a
theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project
to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic
elites… Neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital
accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as
in Russia and China) creating, the power of an economic elite. The theoretical utopianism
of neoliberal argument has, I conclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and
legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal. (Harvey 19)
Harvey thinks of Neoliberalism as a scam on the American people and believes that it has
further implications for Neoliberal citizens. In his view, the competition that Neoliberalism
promotes, pitting individuals against one another, naturally lends itself to a certain kind of
Nationalistic sentiment. That competition, combined with the necessity that that competition
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creates for certain authoritarian practices7, like the invasion of Iraq, is primarily justified in these
kinds of Nationalistic terms: ‘I’m going to get mine’ (Harvey 85). This means that the globalization
element of Neoliberalization may be ripe for popular revolt in several ways: 1) anti-immigrant
backlash can foment due to increased openness of borders and increased influx of people, 2) antitrade backlash can foment due to increased reliance on the interdependence of the system, and 3)
Nationalistic fervor, encouraged and emboldened by Neoliberalization’s global competition, can
run rampant through a nation. This is a primary claim examined throughout this paper, and this
section provides the background for examining Neoliberalism’s connection to Globalism.
In reference to the 2016 paper Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It? by
Bram Spruyt et al.., researchers Eric Oliver and Wendy Rahn note that “[Spruyt et al..] argue that
globalization makes certain groups, particularly the less well-educated, insecure both about their
labor market prospects and their status in society. Identifying with the ‘people’ becomes a way to
cope with the uncertainty and vulnerability of their precarious social position” (Oliver and Rahn
192). While Spruyt et al..’s work is in specific reference to contemporary European politics, this
reality has obvious implications for Populists around the globe who could easily exploit such
anxieties about globalization to signal to this subset of the citizenry that they will be protected and
heard by the Populist.
Global Neoliberalization is just one element of the Neoliberal agenda, however. Another
key aspect of Neoliberalism in practice is the repression of labor rights, a concept the highlights
the ideological inconsistency that Neoliberalism carries with its deference to “freedom”.
Neoliberalism is highly opposed to the collective organization of labor and frequently makes
decisions at the expense of the laborer. The result tends to be lower wages, increased job insecurity,

7

The authoritarian element of Neoliberalism is an important one to examine. For further reading and detail, please
consult Ian Bruff’s “The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism” in the journal Rethinking Marxism, Volume 26, Issue 1.
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and loss of benefits and job protections (Harvey 76). Harvey cites the assaults on labor rights and
organization in countries like Mexico, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, and China to make the point
that it seems “that labour control and maintenance of a high rate of labour exploitation have been
central to neoliberalization all along” (Harvey 76). In this kind of economy, the social safety net
is stripped, and any personal failure is attributed solely to personal failings, weighing doubly on
the worker. The repression of labor rights and the erosion of public benefits are especially pertient
to my discussion of income inequality and to my discussion of Populist campaigners like Bernie
Sanders, whose campaign had a heavy focus on the rights of the public to access healthcare and
education.
At the same time as Neoliberalism represses labor rights, “Businesses and corporations not
only collaborate intimately with state actors but even acquire a strong role in writing legislation,
determining public policies, and setting regulatory frameworks (which are mainly advantageous
to themselves)” (Harvey 76-77). The role of organizations like the CATO institute and the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in the writing of corporate-friendly legislation
highlights the bias of the Neoliberal system toward the already wealthy and powerful. Harvey
offers a scathing rebuke of this reality: “The coercive arm of the state is augmented to protect
corporate interests and, if necessary, to repress dissent… the neoliberal fear that special-interest
groups would subvert the state is nowhere better realized that in Washington, where armies of
corporate lobbyists… effectively dictate legislation to match their special interests” (Harvey 77).
It is this kind of corporate control that people react strongly to, as evidenced by the strong support
for the campaigns of politicians like Bernie Sanders, who would make the lack of corporate money
in his campaign a key issue in his 2016 run for president. Effectively, while Neoliberal ideology
stresses the importance of individual freedoms, it tramples the rights of workers and citizens to
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favor the elite. This reality is ripe for popular reaction, and the pressures of groups like Occupy
Wall Street bear out that prophecy.
In 1996, World Economic Forum officials Klaus Schwab and Claude Smadja laid out the
logic for the argument that Neoliberalism leads to these types of Populist backlash clearly:
Economic globalization has entered a new phase. A mounting backlash against its effects,
especially in the industrial democracies, is threatening a disruptive impact on economic
activity and social stability in many countries. The mood in these democracies is one of
helplessness and anxiety, which helps explain the rise of a new brand of populist
politicians. This can easily turn into revolt8. (Harvey 81)
It is upon this argumentative basis that I structure my thesis. This thesis explores Populism
in 2016 and tries to see if it is an indicator of wavering faith in the current status quo. Neoliberalism
has been a dominant ideology for about four decades now, but, writing in 2005, Harvey argued
that there are developing cracks in the firmament. Harvey explains that “all is not well with the
neoliberal state, and it is for this reason that it appears to be either a transitional or an unstable
political form. At the heart of the problem lies a burgeoning disparity between the declared public
aims of neoliberalism - the well-being of all - and its actual consequences - the restoration of class
power” (Harvey 78-79). Harvey’s scathing criticism of Neoliberalism – that it was never, in fact,
an honest ideological argument in favor of individual freedoms, but was rather a more insidious
and intentional power grab with the intention of the restoration of class power – highlights the
severity of the tension that he sees between the promise and reality of Neoliberalism and highlights
how it might have laid the ground for popular revolt.

8

It is important to note that these men come from the World Economic Forum, an ostensibly Neoliberal project
dedicated to Neoliberal goals. This quote highlights the realization from within that a threat to that order may be
manifest in the modern world.
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Throughout this paper, I rely mostly on Harvey’s definition of Neoliberalism to explain the
phenomenon. When I am referring to the doctrine of Neoliberalism, I am primarily referring to the
synthesis of the two ideas of Free Market Capitalism and Globalism. This is useful for
understanding both Sanders’ and Trump’s specific brands of Populism. With this understanding
of Neoliberalism in place, I move on to defining Populism and explaining how Sanders and Trump
fit into the equation.

Defining Populism
The Story of Politics
There is a wealth of literature on the subject of Populism. Hundreds of authors have
undertaken the task of defining and explaining it, yet there is no clear consensus on what it is and
what it means for society. Some authors, like Ernesto Laclau, as Mudde and Kaltwasser note,
consider Populism to be both the essence of politics and an “emancipatory force” within it (Mudde
and Kaltwasser 3). Others, like Jan-Werner Müller, think that Populism poses a serious threat to
liberal institutions (Müller 105-114). There is even significant quibbling over just what Populism’s
definition is.

Why is this concept so contentious? A reason behind the lack of consensus stems from the
fact that Populism does not reflect a singular coherent ideology. As Cas Mudde and CristóbalRovira Kaltwasser put it in their text Populism: A Very Short Introduction, “populism almost
always appears attached to other ideological elements, which are crucial for the promotion of
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political projects that are appealing to a broader public. Consequently, by itself populism can offer
neither complex nor comprehensive answers to the political questions that modern societies
generate” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 6). Their work is specifically targeted towards refuting the two
claims that Populism is simply a “political Kampfbegriff (battle term) to denounce political
opponents” and that it is “too vague and therefore applies to every political figure” (Mudde and
Kaltwasser 1). I think that these are important distinctions to be laid out. Populism has many
variants, but that does not mean that a core definition isn’t achievable. With the help of Michael
Kazin’s The Populist Persuasion, supplemented by more of Mudde and Kaltwasser’s work, I lay
out here the definition that I use through the paper.

American Populism and the Durable Frame
Kazin takes a different approach to defining Populism than other authors. From the outset,
he works at establishing a framework within which Populist arguments reside and focuses his
attention on understanding how that framework is used as a vehicle for the rise of Populists. Kazin
views Populism as a kind of political language, a “flexible mode of persuasion” (Kazin 1). To him,
Populism is a vehicle through which politicians and movements attempt to convince the people
that the politician is on their side. It is a narrative and rhetorical device designed to play to the
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values of fellow Americans9. To define Populism, then, takes establishing a narrative framework.
For this, Kazin lays out four recurring elements, which he refers to as “the durable frame”.
The first element is the idea of “Americanism”. Americanism calls upon American
Exceptionalism and plays on the mythical values that Americans are taught to uphold. Its values
rule according to the will of the people and opportunity for all who work hard. It is important to
note here that Americanism is ascriptive; it devotes its attention largely to people who are white,
male, Protestant, and native born, calling upon some of the cultural values that are discussed in
greater detail in my later section “The Context for a Neoliberal World”. This characteristic
highlights one of the ways in which Populism can be exclusive to people outside a certain group.
Americanism is essential in setting apart American Populism. As Kazin notes, “There have, of
course, been populisms in the history of other nations… but populism in the United States has
made the unique claim that the powers that be are transgressing the nation's founding creed, which
every permanent resident should honor. In this sense, American populism binds even as it divides”
(Kazin 2). The narrative invoked by American Populists is empty without this fundamental value
at the heart of it. The story cannot be told without Americanism.
The second tenet of American Populism that Kazin discusses is that of “The People”, an
idea that is recurrent in most definitions of Populism. In American Populism, this invocation can

9

Kazin focuses on defining American Populism, rather than compiling a definition in general terms. I use his
definition because it is thorough and is specific enough to be useful in examining the 2016 election.
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refer to numerous identities: The Sovereign People (“We the People”); the Common People, who
are neither poor nor wealthy, but are people who can rely on common sense; the Producers, or
laborers and those who produce value10; and Real Americans, a group of people who are viewed
as “protectors of Americanism”. There are other potential invocations, but in the American version
of Populism, these tend to be the most common. In their effort to define Populism for their work
Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election, J. Eric Oliver and Wendy M. Rahn argue
that “This construction of a ‘we’ is facilitated also by the invocation of the people's enemies, both
internal and external--the "people" often come to know who they are by who they are not” (Oliver
and Rahn 191). There are several important implications based on this reality. First, it helps us to
understand how xenophobia and nativism often get caught up in the thrust of Populism. References
to “the people” invariably mean “white people”, an implicit racialization that should be understood
to be infused in most narrative invocations of Populism. Second, the idea of the people
understanding who they are by who they are not highlights how Populism can be exclusive: some
people are more worthy of being heard and represented than others. Without the definition of
‘them’, there can be no ‘us’. Populists like Donald Trump would exploit tensions surrounding
immigration within this framework, utilizing white nativist anxieties to help define “the people”
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This invocation is explicitly not Marxist. Populists may, in some cases, espouse similar values to Marxists, but
Populist invocations rarely call for class consciousness or the eradication of the Capitalist state or the ruling class.
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and to craft a Populist message. Oliver and Rahn also tangle with reality that most politicians in
democracies tend to align themselves with ‘the people’. They contend that this may be true,

But populists do more than simply paint themselves on the side of the majority; they make
populist rhetoric the center of their campaigns. Anti-elitism and collectivism are the sine
qua non of their political existence. Their whole purpose is to challenge the dominant order
and give voice to the collective will, goals that are infused with a sense of urgency by
proclaiming that a crisis exists. (Oliver and Rahn 191) [Emphasis mine.]
The third element of Populism refers to “the Elite”, the force that Populists are combatting.
The Elite are often portrayed as wealthy and privileged. They can be viewed as “unproductive
parasites”, or people who are dependent on the labor of others. They are portrayed as un-American
or anti-American; people who are hostile to the basic values of America. Populist invocations
frequently decry Plutocrats as undeserving usurpers of the people’s power. The Elite is understood
to be a corrupting presence, a force that is weakening Americanism and threatening the Republic.

Finally, Kazin describes a synthesis of the first three elements in the Story of Politics.
Simply, the American Populists invoke a specific story of a struggle between the People and the
Elites to “take our country back” and restore the promise of Americanism. This Populist narrative
is not a Marxist telling of the story of politics. It is not espousing revolution and does not seek the
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overthrow of the state. The Story of Politics is the confluence of the other elements that Kazin
discusses and is essential to understanding what Populism is.
Through a synthesis of Kazin’s definition and the supplemental work of Mudde and
Kaltwasser, I gain concrete terminology to use from here on out. Breaking down Populism into
simple, workable terms, I define Populism as a kind of political narrative or rhetorical vehicle that
is employed to mobilize and energize the “people” at a time of crisis or perceived crisis to take on
the “elite” who are viewed as being either responsible for the crisis or being responsible for
personally profiting from the crisis. Both Sanders and Trump employ this narrative in different
ways. I will examine the details in a moment, but for now, understand that I consider Sanders’
brand of Populism to be anti-Capitalist, a philosophy that contrasts Neoliberalism’s doctrine of
Free Market Capitalism, and Trump’s brand of Populism to be anti-Globalist, a philosophy at odds
with the Globalist element of Neoliberalism11. I will speak more on the specifics of these ideas in
a moment. First, I want to make a note about the concept of Producerism.

Notes on Producerism
Understanding Producerism is an essential step toward understanding a large part of
Populist narratives (especially those on the right-wing of the political spectrum). Producerism is

11

Note that, while I focus on economic factors here, Populism is not a singularly economic phenomenon. It
similarly concerns itself with cultural issues and values. The context for this discussion of Neoliberal economic
issues carries with it specific cultural values and ideas that will be laid out in my section “The Context for a
Neoliberal World”.
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itself a confluence of some of the elements of the Populist narrative that provides an insight into
how many define “the people”.
Producerism is a type of messaging utilized by groups like the Tea Party and Populist
leaders like Donald Trump. Producerism is at once a method of scapegoating and a tool for the
Populist to define their audience. It is primarily a confluence of the elements of Americanism and
the definition of “the people”. In a Producer narrative, there are several different kinds of people.
The Producer narrative still recognizes the plight of the people against the elite, but it is also
focused on delineating between the deserving and undeserving. As the Tea Party would define it,
this separates regular people into two categories: the “makers and the takers” (Judis 56). The
“makers”, or the “Producers”, are the productive members of society; the average people who put
in honest work and try their hardest. They represent the quintessential American man (and it is
usually a man) who has common sense and adheres to the fundamental values of Americanism.
These makers are putting in honest work but are being squeezed by the rest of the system. In a
Producer narrative, both the Elite and the “takers” are the villain. The takers are the underclass of
‘the people’ that are just as parasitic as the Elite. Through their acceptance of public benefits that
they are “undeserving” of, they are seen as squeezing the makers who are just trying to get on.
As one can see, this narrative of Producerism plays on the natural divisions of the different
elements of American Populism and expands the scope of targeting for a Populist. Additionally, it
shows clearly how Populism can be very exclusive to those outside the fixed definition of the
people. Right-wing Populists that focus on scapegoating the immigrant or welfare classes of a
society regularly invoke the narrative of Producerism to signal to their base that they are the good,
honest people who are being caught (much like a vise-grip) between the pressures of the
undeserving poor, who squeeze the makers by accepting public benefits paid for through taxation,
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and the parasitic Elite, who are either attacking the common people politically or assaulting them
economically. The Producer narrative is invoked to stoke fears about already hated classes in order
to get a base riled up to fight back. The Producer narrative is an extremely effective tool that sees
invocations both by politicians trying to lay claim to explicitly Populist narratives and by regular
politicians who see its message as a useful tool for accomplishing a certain policy goal. This
concept is essential to understand the broader concept of Populism.
When Does Populism Work?
Populism, regardless of our feelings toward it, is an ever-present undercurrent in political
society. As Mudde and Kaltwasser note, “… populism is a moral and Manichean discourse that
exists in society regardless of the presence of populist actors. Whether one likes it or not, many
citizens interpret political reality through the lens of populism” (Mude and Kaltwasser 97). As a
method of framing issues and defining political narratives, it isn’t something that can be easily
eradicated. Instead of focusing on eradicating it, then, it is better to focus on understanding when
and why prospective politicians invoke the framing of Populism to make appeals to the populace.

For a political message to succeed, the public must be primed to receive it. Populism, as a
political narrative, is no exception. Mudde and Kaltwasser note that “[Populist narratives are] set
in motion when the perception is widespread that threats to the very existence of society are
present. This is why major policy failures, such as dramatic economic downturns and, above all,
disclosures of cases of systematic corruption can work as a catalyst for populist attitudes among
the population” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 100). These kinds of policy failures, Harvey, Barrett, and
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Judis would argue, are evident in the rise of such issues as income inequality. Mudde and
Kaltwasser continue to note that a feeling that the government is unresponsive to the demands of
the people is an additional contributing factor to the rise and success of Populism (Mudde and
Kaltwasser 101). Major corruption scandals (especially systemic corruption) are “fertile breeding
grounds” for Populist sentiment (Mudde and Kaltwasser 110). These kinds of policy failures and
scandals create demand for a Populist to come along and rail against the corruption of those at the
top. It is in these perceived times of crisis that Populists can most effectively communicate their
narrative. Mudde and Kaltwasser bring this point home: “In other words, whether populist actors
become successful in terms of electoral strength, agenda-setting, or policy impact is strongly
related to their ability to develop a credible narrative of crisis” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 106). This
understanding of Populism as borne out of times of crisis12 is central to my definition and
understanding of Populism.

Populism on the Left and Right and How Trump and Sanders Fit the Mold
The definition of Populism is further complicated by the reality that there is no pure
archetype for it. Populism on the right- and left-wings manifests in very different ways. Both
political angles offer complex variations on an already convoluted narrative. As such, the central
ideas of each manifestation and some related examples should be laid out.

12

Or perceived crisis; the crisis can be real or manufactured so long as the Populist is capable of selling their
message as credible.
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To start, let’s examine left-wing (or “Progressive”) Populism. Progressive Populists
challenge existing social hierarchies in the name of the “common man”, an invocation of “the
People”. Progressive Populists tend to focus on economic issues. Their vision is more inclusive
and optimistic, often projecting a more egalitarian future. Though their rhetoric is more inclusive
than that of right-wing Populists, they still often fail to call out race and gender oppression.

There have been numerous examples of Progressive Populists throughout history. One of
the first Populist movements in the U.S. was the People’s Party in the late 19th century: Their calls
for a graduated income tax, the nationalization of the railroads, and the reworking of the gold
standard to include both silver and gold showcase the economic and egalitarian aims of Progressive
Populists. Their focus on agrarian issues (most of which tended to deal solely with white, landowning and often Protestant males), however, shows the limits of Progressive Populism. The
Labor Movements throughout the early 20th century also showcase a brand of Progressive
Populism focused on economics. The Civil Rights Movement and the New Left in the 1950s and
60s provide good examples of Progressive Populists moving more toward acknowledgement of
social and cultural issues. The final two examples are the Occupy Wall Street movement and the
candidacy of Bernie Sanders for U.S. President in 201613, both of which offered explicit criticisms
of economic inequality through the lens of income inequality.
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For more detailed information on all of these movements and the ones discussed in the next section, refer to
Michael Kazin’s The Populist Persuasion and John B. Judis’ The Populist Explosion.
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Right-wing Populism, by contrast, tends to focus on a more oppressive narrative. Rightwing Populists combine anti-Elite scapegoating with efforts to maintain or intensify systems of
social privilege and power. Their message tends to be more disruptive, Kazin argues, as they
frequently deflect popular discontent away from positive social change. Their definitions of the
People are less inclusive; some are “more American” than others. In their narrative, they stigmatize
the oppressed as “unproductive”. Their rhetoric is often prone to xenophobia, nativism, racism,
and anti-Semitism. They tend to characterize the Elite as excessively tolerant of un-American
values like political correctness or multiculturalism. This elite is often defined in cultural or
political terms rather than economic ones. Finally, right-wing Populist tend to encourage the
oppression of those who don’t fit the picture of ‘Real Americanism’.

There are plenty of examples of this kind of scapegoat-heavy Populism in U.S. history. The
Know-Nothing Party, for example, operated on nativist and xenophobic political messaging that
targeted immigrants and Catholics in the 1850s. The Prohibition movement and WASP moral
hegemony in the 1920s, additionally, are prime examples of the tendency of right-wing Populists
to look down their nose at values that they perceive as incorrect. Father Coughlin’s anti-Semitic
rhetoric in the 1930s showcased the hateful side of this story of politics. Cold War antiCommunism showcased the tendency of right-wing Populists to play to base fears and a story of
un-Americanism. The Conservative anti-government Populism of Nixon, Reagan, and, more
recently, the Tea Party highlight the anti-Elite values that are harbored in anti-government
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sentiment. In more recent years, the Patriot Militia movement has shown the extremely ugly and
brutal side of violent right-wing Populism. Finally, and most importantly for this paper, Donald
Trump’s candidacy perfectly showcases the exploitation of a story of un-Americanism and foreign
values ruining our society for the middle class.

Bernie Sanders, as mentioned, fits the mold of a Progressive Populist. In this paper, I
understand him as an anti-Capitalist Populist focused on targeting economic issues related to
Neoliberalism. Donald Trump, by contrast, is a right-wing Populist. Throughout this paper, I
consider him to be an anti-Globalist Populist who is focused on Political Populism and issues of
identity and nationalism. Both Sanders and Trump used their campaigns to define specific Elites
to target – in Sanders’ case, the billionaire class and Wall Street, in Trump’s case, the immigrant
class and the political elite, especially liberals – and the “people” that they wanted to appeal to
based on these narratives. As Populists, they also outlined specific crises that they viewed as
pressuring the “people”. Based on Harvey, Barrett, and Judis’ argumentation, the crisis that
Sanders’ exploited would be the issue of income inequality, while the crisis that Trump focused
on was immigration and other issues related to globalism. Throughout this paper, I work to
determine whether these were the narratives that their voters were most attracted to. First, I will
define the key issues that will help me determine what Trump and Sanders’ style of Populism was
and what issues their voters were most interested in being addressed. I do this in order to determine
an answer to the hypothesis that Neoliberalism was the primary catalyst for the success of these
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Populists. Before going about this task, I provide some context for the argument about
Neoliberalism providing a catalyst for Populism.

The Context for a Neoliberal World
As with any ideology, Neoliberalism did not come out of a vacuum. Its ideas were built on
the backs of a burgeoning global culture and decades of economic experimentation. It is also,
importantly, not a singularly economic ideology. It carries with it implicit assumptions about the
world and the way that it works. Its defining motto of “Individual Liberty”, for instance, harkens
back to cultural battlegrounds that have been prominent in the American psyche for at least a
century. Thoroughly Libertarian, it prizes not only economic freedom, but religious and political
freedoms as well. To understand Neoliberalism, then, one needs a solid understanding of the world
in which it was founded. I will limit this discussion for the sake of brevity, but there are a few very
important points that need to be made and understood before moving forward.
In order to supplement my argument about Neoliberalism, I address here the ethno-cultural
elements of America that shaped and defined the world in which Neoliberalism bloomed. Among
these elements are the topics of race and religion. I will refer to several works which carry with
them the implicit reference to theories that help to give context for this discussion. As I will be
providing mostly summary information, these works should be used to fill in the gaps where there
are questions.
Religion and Capitalism
Few could argue the weight of the religious debate that has gripped America for centuries.
In his book One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America, Kevin
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Kruse provides some clarity about the history of that debate. The primary argument in his book
centers on understanding the religious revival of the mid-20th century as an orchestrated effort by
America’s business community to discredit New Deal politics with a biblical argument (Kruse ixxvi). A thorough account, Kruse’s book showcases how corporate leaders, frustrated by Labor
Movement gains and an administration friendly to Labor, came to the conclusion that converting
Americans to their side and to their view of economics would be possible almost solely through a
reclamation of Christian thought. At the time of the New Deal, Christian leaders were largely
preaching the doctrine of the Common Good, praising welfare and collective governance as the
salvation of the people. Corporate leaders, however, figured they could convert conservative
clergymen to their side by preaching the gospel as a doctrine of individual responsibility. With
their “Freedom Under God” ideology in tow, efforts to redefine the national religion as one of
“Christian Libertarianism” began14. Through men like Reverend James W. Fifield Jr. and programs
like Spiritual Mobilization and Religion in American Life (RIAL), corporate leaders disseminated
their Christian Libertarian messages to schoolchildren, clergymen, radio listeners, moviegoers,
political leaders, and everyone in between (Kruse, 1-34 127-161).
Their success was substantial. By 1952, religious and corporate leaders rejoiced in their
election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man whose victory was “nothing less than a
mandate for a national religious revival” (Kruse ix). The movement also succeeded in establishing
the phrase “In God We Trust” on all paper currency and the phrase “One Nation Under God” in
our Pledge of Allegiance (the movement also established the Pledge) and as our national motto
(Kruse 99). All told, the business community drove up church attendance from 36% in 1900 to
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For more detailed information, refer to chapters 1 through 3 in One Nation Under God by Kevin Kruse.
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69% at the end of the 1950s (Kruse xv). Their crusade proved religious nationalism an effective
tool for getting their way.
Importantly for this project, their movement successfully diverted the trajectory of
American politics away from Social Democracy and toward Libertarian non-interventionism and
small-government ideology. Men like Fifield “saw Christianity and capitalism as inextricably
intertwined and argued that spreading the gospel of one required spreading the gospel of the other”
(Kruse 8). In their efforts, they made that link abundantly clear: appeals against “godless
Communism” were direct references to the belief in an America as fundamentally religious as it
was capitalist. Their movement helped to establish the value of free markets and the focus on small
government that came to dominate Neoliberal discussions in later decades. As such, the American
variant of Neoliberalism bears with it implicit cultural assumptions about religious nationalism
that would at first appear unrelated. It is this intrinsic relationship between American Capitalism,
or Neoliberalism, and religion that must be understood as implicit throughout the rest of this
discussion. Though this link is surely established by Kruse’s work, it is important to note that
Christianity and Christians are not a monolith. There are a good many Christians that still believe
in a more socially conscious religious doctrine and plenty of Christians that would never associate
their religion with any kind of political or economic ideology. This discussion of religion and
Capitalism is therefore limited, but it is still an important point of background information.
“Deservingness” and Race in Politics
Beyond religion, the elements of race and racism in American political development cannot
be ignored. As political scientists Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith argue in their piece for
the American Political Science Review titled “Racial Orders in American Political Development”,
we do a disservice to our work if we do not consider race in dissecting political issues. Through
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their effort, they uncover two competing racial orders that have, throughout the course of American
history, been in tension to dominate the direction of political thought. They term these two
competing racial orders a “white supremacist” order and an “egalitarian transformative” order
(King and Smith 1). They elaborate on the historical context of these two, walking through times
in our history when either one has been the dominant philosophy. They examine how these two
schools have shaped political debates, the development of our institutions, and the direction of our
political and social arguments. Importantly, they note that “This ‘racial orders’ thesis rejects claims
that racial injustices are aberrations in America, for it elaborates how the nation has been
pervasively constituted by systems of racial hierarchy since its inception" (King and Smith 1).
Their argument is important for providing background context for the development of all schools
of American thought, and thus has implicit applications to all political science research.
Though I want to leave most of their argumentation to their paper, I do want to cite a few
points that are especially relevant to my discussion. Throughout the course of this paper, I will
necessarily touch on the topic of immigration and relate it to both Populism and Neoliberalism.
Before doing so, I want to use the work of King and Smith to explain some of the racial context
that any analysis of immigration policy inherently carries with it.
One key point that King and Smith make is that domestic race issues are often analyzed
separately from immigration policy. Scholars focus on economic, political, cultural, and
institutional arguments when they analyze immigration policy, but frequently leave out the context
of race. King and Smith argue, however, that this is an intellectually dishonest approach to this
kind of analysis. In the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, the 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act
“establishing race-based national origins criteria”, and the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952, they see that “domestic racial institutions and their proponents have interacted profoundly

M u l l i n s | 36

with immigration policy” (King and Smith 14). Furthermore, they cite Supreme Court decisions
“upholding naturalization preferences for whites to maintain the vision of the United States as an
essentially white country” (King and Smith 15). To bring the point home, they note that
Some white supremacists saw in immigration policy a chance to achieve greater national
'whitening' and even contemplated the removal of all African Americans from the United
States via either forcible or voluntary emigration. A bill passed by the Senate in 1914 but
rejected by the House, after intense NAACP lobbying, sought to exclude all black
immigrants and to permit the exclusion of African Americans who traveled abroad. (King
and Smith 15)
All these cases bring to light a fundamentally racist undercurrent driving American
immigration policy, an element that King and Smith argue is unjustly ignored in analysis of these
types of policy. In citing these cases, they show that race is an inescapable element in American
political development, and thus one that is criminally underrepresented in political science
research.
I also want to touch on another important concept in all of politics: the idea of
“deservingness”. Deservingness is an especially pertinent concept to this discussion because of its
relationship to Populism. Populists often use the idea of deservingness to scapegoat the poor and
immigrant classes. For this discussion, I cite the work of Christopher Ellis and Christopher Faricy
in their article Race, ‘Deservingness,’ and Social Spending Attitudes: The Role of Policy Delivery
Mechanism. In their article, they make the case that
This ‘deservingness heuristic’ undergirds how citizens make sense of social policy: above
and beyond cultural or partisan predispositions, citizens wish to bestow government aid on
those perceived as unlucky or working to better themselves and wish to withhold benefits
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from those perceived as lazy or unsympathetic. Citizens’ attitudes towards government
programs are, in other words, heavily influenced by perceptions of beneficiaries’
deservingness. (Ellis and Faricy 6)
Importantly, the idea of deservingness is implicitly racialized. Ellis and Faricy cite as an
example the idea that many white Americans view African Americans as less committed to the
strong work ethic that, in part, defines Americanism (Ellis and Faricy 6). They argue that it is this
perception that leads to the belief that African Americans are less deserving of government aid
(Ellis and Faricy 6). This racial understanding of deservingness is essential for understanding two
key concepts in Populism, as outlined in the “Defining Populism” section of this paper:
“Americanism” and “Producerism”. Both the idea of Americanism and Producerism carry implicit
racial assumptions as defined by Americans’ understanding of deservingness. As previously
discussed, Americanism carries an ascriptive, mostly white and male definition of “American”.
Producerism uses that same definition to determine who is “deserving”. Those racial elements are
invoked whenever these narratives are employed. With this background understanding of religion
and race in American politics and Populism, then, it is time to move on to discussing some key
variables that will help me test Harvey, Barrett, and Judis’ claims.
Populism in a Burgeoning Neoliberal America
To understand the argumentation laid forth by Harvey, Barrett, and Judis, it is essential to
have the context of how Neoliberalism rose in America. This paper does not have the space to
accommodate a full discussion of this topic, so rather than retreading work that has come before,
I want to make note here briefly of the way that Harvey, Barrett, and Judis see the agenda as
progressing. I also want to lay out a few key policies that have come out of the rise of Neoliberalism
without going too far into the details to allow for more background context on some of the
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discussion in this paper. Barrett and Harvey’s books provide the primary historical walkthrough
for understanding the rise of Neoliberalism, so make note here that they should be consulted for
further reading on this topic.
There are several important points along the road to Neoliberalism as we know it today.
Barrett sees four administrations as being key to the rise of Neoliberalism in the U.S.: Ronald
Reagan’s, Bill Clinton’s, George W. Bush’s, and Barack Obama’s. There are a few key points to
refer to for this project. First, Reagan’s policy of communing with corporate think tanks like the
American Legislative Council (ALEC) and Heritage Foundation to promote business interests and
his work deregulating the economy in favor of such interests provided a key stepping stone for the
rise of income inequality (Barrett 25-32). Second, Clinton’s work passing the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) helped to deregulate and free up the movement of capital while
other policies of his administration tightened border security and reduced the freedom of
movement of people, a contradiction that led to outsourcing and further loss of worker protections
and led to job losses for American manufacturing (Barrett 77-85). Third, Bush’s tax cuts helped to
shore up returns for wealthy corporations and further exacerbated income inequality (Barrett 103105). Finally, Obama’s policies of bailing out the banks after the financial crash, furthering freetrade agreements, and expanding surveillance on U.S. soil contributed to income inequality and
outsourcing and led to greater pessimism about the economy and the corruption of the government
(Barrett 138-159). It is important to understand these issues, even superficially, to understand the
connection that these authors see between these policies and the rise of income inequality and
nationalist sentiment.
In addition to understanding how Neoliberalism arose in America, it is important to take a
brief look at some of the Populist movements that have arisen over the last several decades as
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Neoliberalism has grown. The primary purpose for exploring these movements is to outline the
logic for the argument that anti-Neoliberalism has been an undercurrent in American society for
some time now. In Barrett’s and Judis’ telling especially, these movements are seen as precursors
to the rise of Sanders and Trump and highlight how Populists have made anti-Neoliberal claims
over the years. It is their view that such movements highlight burgeoning anti-Neoliberal sentiment
in America and show how and why Populists like Sanders and Trump could come to enjoy such
support. This is, again, a brief synopsis of complex topics, so please consult Judis’, Barrett’s, and
Harvey’s texts as well as Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson’s The Tea Party and the
Remaking of Republican Conservatism for more detailed accounts of these movements and how
they meet the definition of Populist and these authors’ archetypes of anti-Neoliberalism.
First, the campaigns of Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan in the mid-1990s provide an
interesting blueprint for Populists campaigning on anti-Neoliberal issues. Ross Perot, for instance,
spoke out against NAFTA and runaway trade deals and called for a reigning in of corporate
financing of elections (Judis 47-53). In Judis’ words, “[Ross Perot] and his vote represented the
first clear repudiation of the neoliberal agenda” (Judis 51). Pat Buchanan, meanwhile, campaigned
against transnational corporations and globalism and became the first candidate in the race to
single out illegal immigration, even promising to stop immigration altogether (Judis 52-53). Both
Perot and Buchanan spoke out against corruption and repudiated free trade deals and globalization
that had led to outsourcing, showcasing their own styles of anti-Neoliberal Populism. The Tea
Party is a little more complicated to understand, but they are still important to examine. They
harped on heavily Producerist themes, raging about society being divided into the “makers” and
“takers” and painting minorities and immigrants as part of the parasitic freeloaders who made up
the latter category (Skocpol and Williamson 7-75). They railed against immigration and made
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frequent refrains about “taking our country back”, harping on nationalistic views to promote
slashing public funding and curbing public sector unions. In Judis’ telling, they “attacked
neoliberalism from the far right” in reaction to Obama’s policies of bailing out the big banks and
passing healthcare reform (Judis 55). In many ways, they laid the groundwork for the nationalistic
views of Trump and his supporters. Finally, Occupy Wall Street provided a Populist account from
the left. Framing issues as contained within the framework of the “99% vs. the 1%”, they savaged
Wall Street and the rate of income inequality in the U.S. (Barrett 143-146; Judis 59-61). Their
Economic Populism held striking similarities to the anti-Capitalist refrains of Sanders’ campaign.
These movements help to provide background context on what recent Populist movements
in America have looked like and highlight the similarities between a lot of these movements. The
focus of these movements on issues like immigration and income inequality highlight the
undercurrent of those issues in American society and point to the plausibility of argumentation
focused on these anti-Neoliberal complaints as major catalysts for Populist support. Now, I turn to
examining the issues of income inequality and immigration and globalism more closely.

Key Issues and Variables
In order to examine empirically the hypothesis set forth by Harvey, Barrett, and Judis, I
need some specific variables to measure over the last several decades of Neoliberalism’s presence.
To accomplish this task, I have chosen to focus on several key consequences and policies that
Neoliberalism has created and track public opinion regarding these issues. For this effort, I focus
on two key issues and variables: 1) the rapid rise of income inequality and 2) globalization and
variables related to immigration, including the practice of outsourcing labor to other countries, the
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use of illegal immigrants for cheap labor, and the role of trade15. I will first examine the logic of
how these are related to Neoliberalism in order to see whether there are grounds for legitimate
argumentation that these variables correlate to the rise of Neoliberalism so that I may move on to
test their impact on the 2016 election.
Income Inequality
It may be difficult to remember such a time, but in the 1970s (and for three decades prior),
the top 1% in America only controlled about 8% of the total wealth. Quoting historians Jefferson
Cowie and Nick Salvatore, Barrett makes the point that “The year 1972 [was] the most egalitarian
year in US history… Unemployment was at historic lows, and earnings were at their all-time high
for male wage earners, having climbed an astonishing forty percent since 1960” (Barrett 138). This
couldn’t last, though. During the 1970s, a “crisis of capital accumulation affected everyone
through the combination of rising unemployment and accelerating inflation” (Harvey 14). That
reality presented a very real political threat to the wealthy class. In response, Harvey argues, they
rallied their forces around the doctrine of Neoliberalism. After Neoliberal policies were first
implemented in the late 1970s, “the share of the top 1 per cent of income earners in the US soared,
to reach 15 per cent… by the end of the century” (Harvey 16). During that same period, Barrett
indicates, “Individually, the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans, on average, saw their incomes
double or triple… while a typical worker actually made less in 2011 than in 1968 (adjusted for

15

I initially designed this portion of my research with the intention of also focusing on the role of the Great
Recession and the rise of corporate financing of elections in America, but ultimately came to the conclusion that
these variables unnecessarily muddied the equation. I instead chose to focus on the two variables that I believe to be
most related to Sanders’ and Trump’s campaigns. I make note here that I do believe that the Great Recession and
corporate lobbying are key variables worth discussion, but leave them to future research. Harvey’s, Barrett’s, and
Judis’ text all go into detail on how these topics are related to Neoliberalism and go further to lay out the logic of
how they relate these topics to the rise of Populism. A curious reader should consult these works, but acknowledge
that those variables will not have been empirically tested as income inequality and globalization are here.
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inflation). As a group, the richest 1 percent of Americans roughly doubled both their share of the
nation's income (to 20 percent) and their share of the nation's wealth (to 40 percent)” (Barrett 4).
Barrett continues to note that bubbles in the housing and ‘dot-com’ markets, combined with the
results of Clinton-era policies, led to a rise in corporate profits by 88% during the 1990s and a
related rise in CEO pay at a rate of 463% (Barrett 81).
During the same period, U.S. manufacturing lost 1/6th of its total jobs, resulting in
American workers with college degrees competing directly with Mexican counterparts, forcing a
12% wage decline. Neither Barrett nor Harvey were particularly surprised by such results. Barrett
sees the expansion of economic inequality as a direct result of Neoliberalism, arguing that, through
its policies of transferring public resources into a few private hands, accomplished through tax
cuts, deregulation, and privatization, Neoliberalism provided “tremendous benefits for some
people and horrific consequences for many others” (Barrett 159).
All this combined to create the highest levels of inequality the U.S. has ever experienced.
In the modern day, the 1% controls roughly 90% of total wealth, as opposed to the 1%’s share of
8% of the wealth in the 1970s (Harvey 14). Harvey expresses concern over this reality, stating that
“… when income and wealth inequalities reach a point - as they have today - close to that which
preceded the crash of 1929, then the economic imbalances become so chronic as to be in danger
of generating a structural crisis” (Harvey 188-189). It is important to note that Harvey’s book,
published in 2005, was writing about the crisis then. Inequality has been steadily rising. Figure 1:
“Back to the Roaring 1920s” from economists Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman highlights
this trend from 1913 to 2013 for the top 0.1% of Americans (Saez and Zucman).
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The American Political
Science Association (APSA), in
their journal Perspectives on
Politics,

highlight

the

consequences of such inequality
in

the

article

“American

Democracy in an Age of Rising
Inequality16. In the paper, they
contend that “Our country’s
ideals of equal citizenship and responsive government may be under growing threat in an era of
persistent and rising inequalities” (“American Democracy” 651). Importantly, they consider that
many other nations like the U.S. have seen similar social and economic changes, but “comparative
research… indicates that the policies pursued by various governments matter. Regulations, tax
policy, and social programs, for example, have been successfully used elsewhere to buffer marketgenerated increases in socioeconomic inequalities” (“American Democracy” 654). This is
important because the implication is that the provision of a social safety net backed by policies
meant to reign in the consequences of unfettered Capitalism could have helped mitigate the rise in
inequality. The logical conclusion is that policies less concerned with deregulation and tax cuts, as
Neoliberalism is, might have helped avoid such a crisis. This strongly suggests that Harvey might
be on to something in tying the rise in income inequality to the practice of Neoliberalism. The
crisis created by this reality, as outlined by Harvey, Barrett, and the APSA also ties Neoliberalism

16

I will use only summary statistics here; except for the preliminary discussion on the rise in inequality and its ties
to Neoliberalism, I will not walk out the details. Please refer to this paper or Harvey’s, Barrett’s, or Judis’ books for
more detailed information on the phenomenon.
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to a potential Populist backlash, given that the presence of a crisis presents an opportunity to
exploit it rhetorically. To see whether this argument holds water, I now turn to examining
Americans’ feelings toward income inequality to try to understand empirically if it might be a
variable that led to a rise in Populist sentiment.
Specific feelings about income inequality, measured in feelings toward the fairness of the
distribution of wealth and money in the country, do not reflect much change over the last several
decades. In his analysis of polling data for Gallup, Frank Newport found that, while a strong
majority of Americans think that wealth and money should be more evenly distributed (63%), that
figure hasn’t changed much from 1985, when it sat at 60%. Similarly, the figure has not changed,
save for some fluctuations over the years, for the percentage of people who think the distribution
is fair: in 2015, that number was 31%, in 1985, it was the same (Gallup 2015). This finding is
consistent with the explanation that Oliver and Rahn, in their article Rise of the Trumpenvolk, put
forth for the drops in confidence toward government responsiveness found in the mid-90s and in
2016 (Oliver and Rahn 195). In their paper, they find no correlation with objective economic
measures like unemployment or median household income or subjective measures like feelings
toward the economy. Similarly, they conclude that income inequality, as a variable, does not
predict such drops in confidence toward government responsiveness, the variable that they view
as most correlated with the rise in Populism.
There are, however, some indications that income inequality is an issue in the back of
voters’ minds – at least indirectly. For example, two separate questions from a Gallup poll in 2016
– one asking what issue the voter was most interested in having the next president address and the
other asking what the most important issue facing our country today is – saw “the economy” (19%
and 17%) as the number one issue (“Presidential Election 2016”). Importantly, the first question
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also saw 6% answer “wages/ earning a decent wage/ decline of middle class” and another 6% say
“jobs/ unemployment” (“Presidential Election 2016”). A 2015 report from the Public Religion
Research Institute (PRRI) shows similar results, finding that 60% say jobs and unemployment are
critically important issues (the partisan breakdown shows unity on this issue – 66% of Democrats
and 59% of Republicans considered these issues critically important) (Cooper et al. 2015). Though
these are general answers that lack nuance, they do indicate an interest in economic issues that can
be at least tenuously related to income inequality. Further findings from the PRRI study also seem
to indicate that Oliver and Rahn may be too quick to declare the impotence of income inequality
as a variable. Interestingly, 77% said that corporations were not paying a fair share of their
proceeds to employees (Cooper et al. 2015). Similarly, the PRRI report showed Americans
growing increasingly pessimistic about equal opportunity. In 2010, 53% said that one of the
biggest problems in the nation was that we don’t give everyone an equal chance in life and 41%
said it wasn’t that big of a problem. By 2015, those figures had risen and fallen to 65% and 28%
respectively (Cooper et al. 2015).
At the base level, considering income inequality as a concept itself for a variable doesn’t
seem as useful as examining related issues and comparing their rise and fall. There are several
indications that it is still an interesting and useful variable, though, regardless of Oliver and Rahn’s
objections. It is of interest, for instance, that there is a rather large partisan divide on the issue. The
PRRI report found that 48% overall considered it a critical issue, but 62% of Democrats and only
29% of Republicans answered in such a way (Cooper et al. 2015). Such findings suggest that
income inequality might have been a potent Populist catalyst for Democrats and liberals while
simultaneously having little draw for Republicans. Examining specific issues that pertain to
income inequality, like the minimum wage, seems also to bear this out. 59% of all Americans
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favored raising the federal minimum wage to $15, breaking down to 32% for the GOP and a
massive 84% for Democrats (Cooper et al. 2015).
There are other related questions that complicate the narrative. When the Associated Press
asked about the government’s response to income inequality in September 2016, 54% said that it
had not gone far enough and only 7% said that it had gone too far (“Associate Press” 2016).
Interestingly, 25% also said that they “don’t know”, an unusually high number that indicates a lack
of education on the topic. Of similar note is a poll from Pew in September 2016 that asked voters
to choose what economic issue was the most important in their vote for president. In it, “the job
situation” came first with 44% and “income inequality” came second with 38% (“Pew Research
Center” 2016). While the nuances of the responses are left out of the statistical totals, it seems
plausible to speculate that “the job situation” could be related to income inequality and minimum
wage. Respondents might be concerned about unemployment but might similarly be concerned
about finding jobs that pay well. To gain a more complete understanding of the impact of income
inequality on voters in the 2016 election, then, it seems as though a different measure should be
employed. The consistency of the number of Americans that think that wealth and income should
be more evenly distributed (Again, 63% in 2015, 60% in 1985) does not seem to square with polls
that find increasing dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of the issue and with the profits
that corporations make. The high rate of “don’t know” responses – 25% - to the question about the
government’s response to income inequality also seems to indicate a lack of understanding of the
topic. These disparate findings indicate that maybe the measure is faulty. Perhaps the question is
confusing, or maybe voters don’t truly understand what income inequality is. There is a better way
to get a more definitive answer, though. By examining voters’ views toward the minimum wage
in a time series and comparing it to views about the amount of profits that corporations or CEOs
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make and the fairness of the economic system, I can create a proxy for a measure about income
inequality and ascertain a more clear picture of voters’ opinions.
To start, let’s look at support for raising the minimum wage. A 2013 piece from Lydia Saad
for Gallup provides some interesting insight. In 2013, the idea of raising the minimum wage to
$15 an hour was still a moonshot proposal, so Saad’s piece does not focus on that wage increase.
Instead, she looks at support for raising the federal minimum wage to $9 an hour. She offers up an
interesting time series chart that highlights support over recent years (Figure 2: Support for Raising
U.S. Federal Minimum Wage – Recent Trends).

Right away, the chart shows an increase in support for this proposal over the years. In 2013,
though, that support had fallen to about 71% (Saad 2013). That might seem like it was upsetting
the trend, but Saad offers up the explanation that unemployment may have been causing
uncertainty and anxiety that contributed to lower support for the issue. Still, the 2013 data paints
a rather clear and interesting picture. 94% of liberals and 91% of Democrats, for example,
supported raising the federal minimum wage (Saad 2013). 78% of all those 18-29 supported the
increase. 54% of Conservatives and 50% of Republicans supported raising the minimum wage.
67% of those 65 and older had a favorable view of raising the minimum wage. These figures
suggest that, while there is clear support across the board, there is much more reliable support
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amongst liberals and the youth. This is an important finding because, as shall be seen shortly, this
was the primary base for Bernie Sanders’ support in 2016. Such high support suggest that his base
may have been primed for messaging related to income inequality. Additionally, the 2015 finding
from Cooper et al..’s study that showed 59% overall supporting a rise in the minimum wage to $15
an hour, an idea that was too radical to even poll in 2013, highlights how much the minimum wage
was becoming an issue for voters.
Next, I turn to polling on the amount of corporate profits made. Data from Pew is useful
here. An October 2017 report entitled “Shifting Partisan Views of the Fairness of the U.S.
Economic System” provides a time series of responses to statements about economic fairness and
equality from the year 1994 to 2017. There are a few different measures of interest that it provides.
While there are interesting trends overall, the data is most illuminating on a partisan basis. On
views of the fairness of the economic system, for instance, Figure 3 shows a shorter time series
from 2014 to 2017 but highlights how much Democrats and Republicans are split on the fairness
of the economic system (Figure 3: Shifting Partisan Views of the Fairness of the U.S. Economic
System).
This data paints a clear
picture of a Democratic party
increasingly disillusioned with
the economic system. More data
from this report clarifies this
reality even further. Republicans
are further split, for instance, on
the idea of whether hard work
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means that one can get ahead in America. Overall, 68% of voters in 1994 and 61% in 2017 said
that “most people can make it if they work hard” (“Shifting Partisan Views” 2017). Looking at the
partisan breakdown of that figure, 65% of Democrats agreed with that statement in 1994, but only
49% did in 2017. By this measure and the first question of fairness, the data shows a clear growing
pessimism about the economy among Democrats. The last measure – whether business
corporations make too much profit – seems to seal the deal. Overall, since 1994, the percentage of
voters saying that business corporations make too much profit has risen from 52% to 59% in 2017
(“Shifting Partisan Views” 2017). The partisan difference is, once again, stark. That figure rose
from 61% to 73% for Democrats and stayed at 43% for Republicans (with fluctuations over the
years).
Though initial survey research could not provide a clear answer about trends in views
toward income inequality, breaking the question down into the parts of views toward the minimum
wage and views toward corporate profits and economic fairness seems to have painted a clearer
picture. The trend overall reflects a growing desire for greater compensation and increasing
pessimism about the economy, but that trend is far better represented amongst Democratic voters
than Republicans. While this suggests that income inequality may not have been a driving factor
for all voters in 2016, it does imply that Democratic voters may have been especially receptive to
messaging about this issue. As such, it seems legitimate to move forward with examining Bernie
Sanders’ supporters for concerns about this issue and seems appropriate to suggest that Sanders
may have put forth a credible Populist message focused on income inequality. That discussion will
come shortly, but first I turn to examining the issue of globalization and immigration.
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Global Capitalism and Nativism
The subject of global Neoliberalization is a rather broad one, covering such things as wars,
trade, immigration, and refugee flows. I focused on a lot of these issues earlier in my section
“Defining Neoliberalism”, so I don’t want to re-tread that ground now. Instead, I want to focus on
one key factor: immigration. Specifically, I want to focus on the exploitation of undocumented
immigrants for cheap labor (and the reactions to that) and what I shall call the “crisis of American
Exceptionalism and identity”. By the latter variable, I refer to Harvey and Barrett’s idea that
Neoliberalism’s economic and cultural dimensions work hand in hand - through things like wage
stagnation and free trade agreements that portend an influx of immigrants and the “browning” of
America – to create anxieties, whether they are justified or not, about the fundamental American
identity, leading to upticks in nativism and xenophobia.
I think that the most important and telling aspect of this story is the business community’s
role. Corporations, looking to stay competitive, have used free trade agreements and the doctrine
of Neoliberal globalization in order to gain cheap labor from illegal immigrants and cheaper
production from offshoring and outsourcing. Such acceptance by the business community of illegal
immigration for its cheap labor leads to certain contradictions, however. For example, in 2010, the
Arizona legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 1070, a law that required law enforcement to prosecute
immigration laws to their fullest extent, leading to the harassment and racial profiling of
immigrants (Barrett 154). This obviously racialized bill was promoted by the likes of ALEC,
whose members included the Corrections Corporation of America, a private prison company
standing to gain from the increased detention of illegal immigrants (Barrett 154). At the same time,
ALEC was busy promoting trade deals like NAFTA and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) that
have been shown to increase levels of immigration of all kinds (Barrett 154). Such contradictions
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highlight the tension in the Neoliberal narrative from the corporate perspective, but I am more
interested in the concerns of regular Americans.
This is where the cultural context discussed in “The Context for a Neoliberal World” most
comes into play. The idea of American Exceptionalism has both an economic and cultural
dimension. Economically, it espouses the idea that our economy should be the most productive
and our workers should have the highest standard of living, an idea that is undermined by the wage
stagnation generated as a result of Neoliberalism. Culturally, it has a fixed definition of American:
mostly white, Anglo-Saxon with an emphasis on limited government and responsible choice. In
the modern day, however, when globalism has led to a global community rich with multicultural
ideas and practices, it’s becoming increasingly less clear that the kinds of things that were supposed
to have made America exceptional in the past will continue to do so. That idea can be scary for
some, and the anxieties presented are inherent in such proposals as Donald Trump’s border wall,
which very literally tells the world that “we’re inside, you’re outside, and it will stay that way”. In
essence, such a project would be a monument to Americans needing to feel exceptional and special.
Such tensions and contradictions should be observable in polling data. In order to gauge
public opinion, then, I choose to test variables related to trade and offshoring, immigration and
diversity, and the global role of the U.S. For this, I primarily rely on the PRRI report from 2015
and a Pew Research study from 2018 that tracks the roots of modern nationalism around the world.
Immediately, the data seems to bear fruit. The PRRI report, for instance, shows that in
2012, 74% said that corporate offshoring was a major cause of the nation’s economic issues, a
number that rose to 86% in 2016 (Cooper et al. 2015). In a similar vein, the Pew study found that
(in 2018, but the trend held steady from 2016) 49% of Americans viewed global economic
engagement as a bad thing (Stokes 2018). The rest of the findings highlight a similarly isolationist
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mindset. 57% of the U.S. said that the country should deal with its own problems; 46% said that
the U.S. in 2016 was less important than it was 10 years ago. Only 41% said that the U.S. should
help other countries deal with their problems while 54% said that the U.S. should focus on its own
problems (and 70% of Trump supporters responded this way) (Stokes 2018). The ANES time
series found similar trends, with the percentage of the U.S. saying that the country should not
concern itself with world problems rising sharply from 20% in 2004 to 40% in 2012 and then
falling slightly to 37% in 2016 (“The ANES Guide” 2017). All these trends reflect growing
isolationist sentiment and heightened nationalism. The data on diversity also correlates with these
findings, albeit only on a partisan basis. According to the Pew study, 47% of Republicans and 70%
of Democrats said that immigrants make the U.S. a better place to live in 2018 (Stokes 2018). In
2016, 60% of Democrats and only 33% of Republicans said that immigrants strengthen the country
with their hard work and talents, as compared with 32% and 30% respectively in 1994. Such
findings corroborate Oliver and Rahn’s assertion that, in 2016, Republicans (and especially Trump
supporters) were primed for nativist Populism (Oliver and Rahn 199-201). In their study, they
found that Trump supporters were the most prone to feelings of social alienation and nativism and
the most fearful of immigrants, all while scoring the highest for national affiliation (Oliver and
Rahn 199-201).
There may be a partisan split, but the data are clear: nativism and isolationism have grown
rapidly in the U.S. That nativism seems to have grown in the face of the “browning” of America,
suggesting that there may be real feelings of a crisis of American identity. That crisis is ripe for
exploitation for Populists who naturally provide an identity for their supporters. Where Democrats
had income inequality, it appears that Republicans had immigration and globalism. In order to
determine the relationship of this variable to real Populist rhetoric, I will come back to it later in
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discussing the views of the supporters of Trump and his supporters. For now, I consider this
variable tied to the consequences of Neoliberalism, and thus tied to anti-Neoliberal sentiment.

Populism and the 2016 Election Cycle
The most pressing question that this project tries to get at, in simple terms, can be boiled
down to two words: “Why now”? In Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election,
Oliver and Rahn asked the same question and came to the conclusion “…that populism originates
in a political source, namely, when existing political parties are not responding to the desires of
large sections of the electorate. We call such conditions a ‘representation gap’” (Oliver and Rahn
194). This is a useful measure for this thesis because it provides a place to look for an explicit
bridge between Neoliberalism and Populism. If voters perceive this representation gap, and
Populism is truly and empirically present, then for Neoliberalism to be seen as the primary driving
impetus, it must be linked to this representation gap. It seems plausible that examining the issues
that voters supporting Trump and Sanders cared most about and searching for a connection to
Neoliberal policies or consequences would provide an answer to this question.
Populists commonly frame themselves as “outsiders” seeking to offer alternatives to the
political mainstream. Trump and Sanders were no different, but what is surprising is the degree to
which the other candidates during the primaries also employed Populist rhetoric in an attempt to
connect with voters.
Using questions about government responsiveness from sources like Pew Research Center,
American National Election Studies, and Gallup, Oliver and Rahn set out to examine Populism in
2016 and the key components surrounding it. They take the presence of Populism for granted at
the outset, citing several previous studies (Bonokowski and Gidron 2016, Hawkins 2009, Jagers
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and Walgrave 2007, Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, and Rooduijn 2014) to show that the
overabundance of Populist rhetoric among all of the primary candidates can be quantitatively and
empirically proven. The prevalence of Populist language is important to note because it signals the
demand (or perceived demand) for such language in 2016. Outside of these external studies that
they link, they also conduct their own regression analysis based upon the questions and tenets set
forth by other surveyors. They primarily rely on the methodology of Bonokowski and Gidron,
whose analysis of campaign speeches found “sharp differences between the political parties in
terms of the content of the populist claims: Republicans were much more likely to critique political
targets whereas Democrats concentrated on economic elites” - to guide their own content analysis
of the speeches of each primary candidate (Oliver and Rahn 192). For this, they set up so-called
‘dictionaries’ of language wherein they define specific phrases that fall under the category of either
“Political” or “Economic” Populism. They differentiate between the two by defining Political
Populism as being targeted toward the system, special interests, and lobbyists (and any language
that falls under the purview of those kinds of criticisms) and Economic Populism as targeting Wall
Street, millionaires, the rich, and anything related to such topics. The word “elite” appeared in both
dictionaries. This methodology allows them to examine each candidate and their specific Populist
appeal and to understand what issues were received the best by each candidate’s base.
In addition to this measure of Populism among primary challengers, Oliver and Rahn also
set out to examine “people's feelings toward the political process, experts and common wisdom,
and attachment to an American identity” (Oliver and Rahn 196). To accurately gauge these
undercurrents in American society, they measure three variables: Anti-Elitism (measured in
questions like ‘people like me don’t have much power’ and other questions about the role of the
elites and the wealthy in the political process), mistrust of experts (measured in questions like ‘I’d
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rather trust ordinary people’), and national affiliation (measured in questions like ‘I consider
myself to be like other Americans’). I will not examine results now, but I will refer to this and the
previously mentioned study when explaining the core beliefs of Sanders and Trump. I wanted to
explain the way that Oliver and Rahn examined their variables so that a comprehension of their
variables and methods could be established before the rest of my discussion.
To examine the roots of Populism and the attractiveness of its message, I will make note
here of the prevalence of Populist language overall but will focus in specifically on Sanders and
Trump as campaigners. For this focus, I will examine general public opinion data and will compare
the nation’s feelings at large to the beliefs of the supporters of each of these two candidates. I use
a variety of polling tools for this, including but not limited to: Pew Research Center, Gallup, Public
Religion Research Institute, American National Election Studies, and Oliver and Rahn’s study. I
will begin by defining each candidate’s message and style of Populism and will employ data
throughout.
In a lot of popular analysis being produced during the 2016 campaign season, Trump's
success was attributed to his ‘personality’ while Sanders' was tied to his ‘authenticity’. Judis
argues, however, that
What’s missing from these explanations is the way Trump’s and Sanders’s political
messages have resonated with large parts of the electorate. From the right and left,
respectively, Trump and Sanders were taking aim at the neoliberal consensus, to which
many voters, without naming or identifying it as such, have become hostile, particularly in
the wake of the Great Recession. Trump and Sanders were continuing what Perot and
Buchanan had started, but with a success that suggested the political consensus had become
increasingly vulnerable. (Judis 64)
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The data suggests that that political consensus was legitimately threatened in 2016. Quoting
Vanderbilt Political Scientist Larry Bartels, Eric Levitz, writing for the New York Magazine,
highlights some key findings from Bartels’ study of the 2016 electorate that highlight how that
political consensus has shifted. In contrast to a Neoliberal agenda focused on deregulation and
unconcerned with impacts on the environment, a majority of Democrats and Republicans “endorse
government efforts to regulate pollution, provide a decent standard of living for people unable to
work, and ensure access to good health care” (Levitz 2018). Additionally, voters from both parties
agree on a wide range of economic issues including increased government spending on healthcare,
the preservation of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, a guarantee of affordable healthcare for people
with pre-existing conditions, subsidized tuition for public colleges and universities, the provision
of a “public option” for the internet, and the maintenance of taxation levels on corporations and
the wealthy “at least as high as they were before the Trump tax cuts passed” (Levitz 2018). These
are sprawling issues that are inconsistent with the Neoliberal agenda. Any one of these positions,
then, expresses at least some anti-Neoliberal sentiment – the kind of attitude that Judis, Harvey,
and Barrett believe to be ripe for Populist exploitation. To try to understand whether they were
right, I examine Sanders’ and Trump’s rhetoric and the demographics and beliefs of their
supporters. I rely heavily on polling data from sources like ANES, Pew Research Center, and
Gallup to examine the beliefs of the supporters of each candidate.
Before moving on, it should be pointed out that Political Science research has shown that
voters conform readily to the views of the party elites that they follow (Bullock 2011). This
suggests that polling data may not tell the whole story, as it is not immediately obvious whether
the data represents the real views and concerns of the voters or the concerns of the elites that they
have latched on to. I take a few steps here to determine the legitimacy of the polling data I use.
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First, John Bullock’s study “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate”
shows that, while the concern that voters simply adopt the views of party elites is valid, it should
be tempered with his findings that voters “rarely possess even a modicum of information about
policies; but when they do, their attitudes seem to be affected at least as much by that information
as by cues from party elites” (Bullock 2011). That first finding indicates that being informed plays
a huge role in the independence of voters’ issue orientation. It means that, when voters are more
educated about an issue, their opinions are more likely to be shaped by the information they have.
Thus, it is plausible to assume that greater education overall might lead to greater independence in
voting, indicating that polling data related to more educated voters may be more accurate.
The second way that I will account for the legitimacy of this polling data is by isolating the
demographics of the voters of each candidate and searching for a connection between those
demographics and the kinds of beliefs that would lead one to be attracted to anti-Capitalist and
anti-Globalist Populism respectively. To do this, I break down the demographics of each
candidates’ support, look for defining factors or traits among them, and then look for evidence that
that group of voters may be predisposed to throw their support behind the kind of Populism that
each candidate offered. I turn first to an analysis of Bernie Sanders.
Sanders and Economic Populism
If there’s one thing Bernie Sanders is known for, it’s his famous refrain that “the wealthiest
1/10 of 1% own as much wealth as the bottom 90%” (“Bernie Sanders for President”). If there’s
another, it’s his consistency on that issue over decades of political activism. It is this kind of
Economic Populism that sets Bernie out from the start. Sanders’ message is clear and recognizable.
His refrains are simplistic and consistent and offer an unambiguous criticism of the economic
order. In their study, Oliver and Rahn found that roughly 99% of Sanders’ language in 2016 fell
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under the purview of “Economic Populism” (Oliver and Rahn 193). Sanders has been in Congress
for several decades now, and his message has maintained. He has always been a clear and
outspoken voice against income inequality, and in recent years, he has turned his focus to explicit
criticisms of Neoliberalism and the status quo.
For this reason, I consider Sanders’ rhetoric and campaign messaging to be an antiCapitalist brand of Economic Populism. This brand of Populism encapsulates rhetoric attacking
the established wealthy class and economic order and speaking out against what he perceives to
be the consequences of Capitalism. It casts the elite as the wealthy billionaires and the politicians
that protect them and challenges that they have rigged the system against honest, hardworking
Americans. This definition is important as I work to understand whether his base was especially
primed for this kind of Populist messaging and whether it was this aspect of his candidacy that
was most appealing and desirable for his supporters. To understand why I view his issues this way,
I will briefly examine his history and rhetoric.
Take first, for example, Sanders’ Senate floor speech on September 18, 2008. Nowhere is
his criticism of Neoliberalism more obvious. In his opening statements, he outlines his belief that
the then-current economic crisis was directly the fault of Neoliberal practices. He sees the crisis as
being “primarily because of one reason”: government policy and ideology has been “dominated
by an extreme right-wing position that tells us… that government is bad and government has got
to get out of the way so that we can allow large multinational corporations and the wealthiest
people in this country to… create prosperity for all Americans”. Sanders spends the rest of his
speech decrying tax breaks on the wealthy and corporations; decrying the bailouts of companies
like AIG, whose failure he views as “closely tied to the same extremist ideology that has been
pushing us toward economic disaster”; criticizing the policy of “unfettered free trade” that doesn’t
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focus on American manufacturing and “throws American workers out on the street”; blaming the
financial collapse on deregulation, saying that the government couldn’t check the policies of
corporations because it had no idea what was going on; pushing for re-regulation in all industries;
and reminding his colleagues of the declining middle class and falling real wages (Bernie Sanders,
Senate Floor Speech 9/18/2008).
That kind of rhetoric was a mainstay of Sanders’ 2016 campaign as well, and his
consistency throughout the years makes him an obvious choice for examination. I find Sanders’
message of interest for two reasons: 1) his consistency lends a degree of credibility and authenticity
to his particular brand of Populism, characteristics that are not often ascribed to the rather cynical
practice of Populism and 2) the fact that he has been espousing the same rhetoric for decades but
only in 2016 chose to make a run for president (and in doing so, became a national phenomenon)
suggests that 2016 is worth examining as a unique outlier for its degree of Populism. To understand
him and the context of the 2016 election, then, let’s begin examining his issues.
John B. Judis, in The Populist Explosion, makes note of the reality that, despite a long
political career, Sanders has always made a habit out of addressing yawning economic inequality.
Judis contends that “In the House and Senate, [Sanders] stood firm against the party's embrace of
neoliberalism. He opposed NAFTA and the agreements with China, tax cuts on business, budgets
that reduced social spending, and financial deregulation” (Judis 80). In December 2010, Sanders
filibustered the budget and tax agreement that would prolong tax cuts for the wealthy (Judis 80).
In 2016, Sanders thought of income inequality as a welcome campaign issue. Speaking on the
topic, Sanders remarked “How do we address these issues in a way that takes on the billionaire
class. Where they have significant control over the media, where they by and large determine the
legislation that goes on in Congress, and as a result of Citizens United are prepared to buy the
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United States Congress” (Judis 81). It is clear that Sanders understands himself as an anti-Capitalist
– if not explicitly anti-Neoliberal – figure. His focus on economic issues that address the perceived
representation gap also provides a clue as to how he chooses to frame the issue as because of these
Capitalist forces. Sanders’ campaign also focused on a number of other issues that were either
explicitly anti-Capitalist or offered alternatives to the Neoliberal order, including a single-payer
healthcare system, free tuition for public colleges and universities financed by a “transaction tax
on Wall Street speculation, and the reinstatement of the Glass-Stegall Act “separating commercial
and investment banking” (Judis 81-82; “Bernie Sanders for President 2016”).
There can surely be no argument that Sanders offered a strong anti-Neoliberal policy
platform, but the presence of such a platform would be meaningless without indications of public
support. To understand this dimension, then, I turn to some public opinion data pulled from both
Judis’ text and Oliver and Rahn’s study.
Judis argues that “Sanders's support, like Trump's, showed how much the Great Recession
had radicalized significant parts of the electorate” (Judis 83). This analysis highlights the synthesis
of Neoliberalism to Populism by directly connecting a ‘crisis’ – the Great Recession – to a Populist
backlash. For his analysis of both Trump and Sanders’ supporters and empirical backing for his
claims, Judis turns to two major polls: An American National Election Studies (ANES) poll in
January 2016 and a Pew Research Center poll in March of the same year. In the Pew poll, Judis
discovered that an astonishing 91% of Sanders’ voters thought the U.S. system unjustly favors the
powerful, 82% thought that corporations make too much profit, and 57% thought that hard work
was no guarantee of success (Judis 84). From the ANES poll, Judis found that 90.2% of Sanders’
voters thought that differences in income between the rich and the poor were larger than they were

M u l l i n s | 61

20 years ago17, and 63.3% thought that there was little or no opportunity for the average person to
get ahead in America (Judis 84). These statistics highlight extreme pessimism about economic
futures for individuals and the nation, a reality that explains both Sanders’ heavy reliance on
Economic Populism and just why it was so attractive to his supporters.
Judis has his own explanation of where Sanders’ voting base came from:
They are, in effect, the descendants of the McGovern generation who began gravitating to
the Democratic party over post-material social and environmental concerns and over moral
outrage at the Vietnam War and later the American invasion of Iraq and more recently, in
the wake of the Great Recession, what they saw as the irresponsibility of Wall Street and
the billionaire class. (Judis 84)
Judis indicates his belief that young voters were concerned about the opportunities that
might await them in the wake of the crash (Judis 84-85). A large percentage of younger voters
were also struggling with student loan debt that they weren’t sure they were going to be able to
pay off. Their economic anxieties reflected real trends. “According to the Economic Policy
Institute, the real inflation-adjusted wages of young college graduates were 2.5 percent lower in
2015 than they were in 2000. At the same time, student debts … skyrocketed, rising by 84 percent
from 2008 to 2014” (Judis 85).
Oliver and Rahn’s study found some similar conclusions, but also highlighted other
interesting realities outside the realm of economics. Their study on Populism among primary
candidates indicates that Sanders’ supporters score the highest for “political marginalization” but
score the lowest in both “national affiliation” and “mistrust of experts” (Oliver and Rahn 200). In
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A feeling that is, it should be pointed out, supported by the data.
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other words, in an election year where Nativism and anxieties about immigration became
mainstays, Sanders’ supporters showed a surprising adherence to chiefly economic and political
concerns, choosing to focus on political representation and rampant inequality rather than race
relations. This is consistent with the partisan divide on immigration outlined earlier in the “Key
Issues and Variables” section of this paper and suggests that different portions of the electorate
may have been primed for different styles of Populist messages.
The important question is still whether these findings are legitimate representations of the
beliefs of Sanders’ supporters. In order to test this, I look at the demographic breakdown of his
support. Writing for Vox.com in 2016, Jeff Stein points out that, given Sanders’ strong support in
rural areas, there was a persistent myth that Sanders’ main line of support came from the White
working class. Looking further into the demographics, though, shows that the one standout and
defining characteristic of Bernie Sanders’ supporters was their youth18 (Stein 2016). Stein points
out that young voters tend to be poorer, so support from them can look like support from the
working class.
If youth is the defining factor among Sanders’ supporters, then it is the place to look for an
electorate primed for anti-Capitalist rhetoric. An obvious place to start this analysis would be an
examination of support for/ opposition to Capitalism amongst the youth compared to the same
figure for Socialism. Two separate surveys on the issue bear fruit. First, Frank Newport, writing
for Gallup in 2018, shows that, over the last several years, Democrats overall have grown to be
more positive about Socialism than Capitalism. Additionally, in 2016, 57% of all (an important
note, as this includes not just Democratic voters) those aged 18-29 viewed Capitalism favorably,
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Defined as 18-29 year old voters.

M u l l i n s | 63

a figure that had declined from 68% in 2010 (Newport 2018). 55% of this group viewed Socialism
favorably, the highest of any age group. A 2016 YouGov, cited in Judis’ text, had the same
findings. Those aged 18-29 had a favorable view of Socialism by 43% to 26% and Democrats
overall favored it 42% to 34% (Judis 85). Given that Sanders’ supporters’ primary demographic
identity was that of youth and that they were also mostly Democrats and liberals, it seems that his
voters were especially primed for anti-Capitalist rhetoric. This provides support for Harvey and
Judis’ claims that Neoliberalism played a key role in catalyzing support for Economic Populism.
It is important to note that while Sanders provides a clear and obvious case of connecting
anti-Neoliberal sentiment to Populism, he also failed to win his party’s nomination. His message
may have been well-received19, and there were certainly realistic complaints about the legitimacy
of the process, but as popular and influential as he might have been, a case analysis of just his
campaign and supporters would not do much to help explain the general trend of Populism in 2016
and the apparent potency of such Populist messages. Bernie Sanders’ success as a candidate should
be measured in the impact that is already being felt in the Democratic party, which has begun to
turn against the Neoliberal orthodoxy on “finance, trade, and capital mobility” (Judis 87). This is
an achievement worthy of note, and it is for this reason that I think it important to acknowledge
the power of the pressure inherent in his anti-Neoliberal message. To understand the whole of
Populism in 2016, though, it is important to get a broader picture. To do this, I turn to examining
the ideology of Donald Trump and his supporters and similarly examine the polling data related to
them. Doing so provides a second case of explicit American Populism that might help further
dissect this narrative.

19

He did, after all, break fundraising records, raking in more than 2.3 million individual donations on the back of his
promises to deny any money from corporate influences (The Atlantic: “Bernie Sanders’s Big Money”).
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Making America Great Again: Populism, Nativism, and Racial Anxieties
To Oliver and Rahn, Donald Trump is a unique phenomenon among the 2016 field of
candidates. Though almost every other candidate readily employed Populist-styled messaging,
Trump stands out as the “Populist par excellence”. In their study, they found that “content analysis
of campaign speeches shows that Trump, more so than any other candidate, employs a rhetoric
that is distinctive in its simplicity, anti-elitism, and collectivism. Original survey data show that
Trump's supporters are distinctive in their unique combination of anti-expertise, anti-elitism, and
pronationalist sentiments” (Oliver and Rahn 189). Additionally, they found that Trump employed
“Political Populism” (targeting language toward the system, special interests, etc.) the most of any
candidate in the primaries (Oliver and Rahn 193).
Trump’s style of Populism is nicely summed up in a quote from him for the Wall Street
Journal on April 14, 2016: “The only antidote to decades of ruinous rule by a small handful of
elites is a bold infusion of popular will. On every major issue affecting this country, the people are
right and the governing elite are wrong. The elites are wrong on taxes, on the size of government,
on trade, on immigration, on foreign policy” (Oliver and Rahn 189). Trump had no qualms about
his identification as a Populist; in fact, he rather leaned into the label. Populism is amorphous,
though, and merely labeling him a Populist is not useful without looking at what his policy
principles were.
Though Trump the President has implemented policies that have often included explicitly
Neoliberal actions without much divergence from the course set by his predecessors (like tax cuts
for the rich, the expansion of private prisons, further privatization and deregulation, and, as Reagan
did before him, appointments of officials – like Scott Pruitt and the EPA – to head offices that they
oppose), Trump the Campaigner approached the electorate with a Populist message riddled with
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anti-Neoliberal criticisms (Barrett 168-70). On the campaign trail, Trump offered a platform that
truly diverged from traditional Republicanism. His views on the issues tended to shift from left to
right, as exemplified in his refusal to adopt an anti-abortion stance to his platform and his calls for
massively increased infrastructure spending. Additionally, he defended Social Security and
Medicare, at times even championing universal healthcare (Judis 65). The core issues that he
campaigned on all had a Nationalistic bent to them, though. Throughout his campaign, his views
on national defense included the position that the U.S. should withdraw from NATO, a shockingly
isolationist declaration that was at home among his other policy positions (Judis 66-67). On the
subject of trade, he opposed NAFTA and the TPP and called for the imposition of tariffs on trading
partners like China, for whom he also wanted a currency reevaluation (Judis 66-67). When it came
to outsourcing and offshoring, he was as outspoken as Sanders: he proposed tariffs on outsourced
goods, criticized companies like Amazon for outsourcing, called for a restoration of American
manufacturing, complained about corporate tax inversions, and even made an appeal to Sanders’
supporters to join him in criticizing the ‘parasitic political system and its donors’ (Judis 69). In
these complaints about offshoring and outsourcing, Judis saw a Trump that was “taking aim at the
skewed distribution of jobs and income that neoliberal economics had created over the prior
decades” (Judis 69). Finally, it is the subject of immigration where Trump made himself known as
a distinctly nativist Populist. Across the board, Trump emphasized an “America First” mentality
which, at its core, was extremely hostile to immigrants, especially illegal ones. His calls to “build
the wall” along the U.S.-Mexico border highlight the synthesis of that “America First” nationalistic
rhetoric to his nativist and isolationist beliefs. For all these reasons, I consider him to be an antiGlobalist Populist with strong nationalistic tendencies.
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In addition to this aspect of his campaign, the inherent contradiction of Trump’s dual
identity as a billionaire and a Populist stood out during the 2016 primary election season. As it
always is, Trump’s Entrepreneur Populism – a billionaire running against the established political
class – was hard to square. In his ad “The Establishment”, Trump wasted no time making the case
for a billionaire Populist. In it, Trump proclaims that “The establishment, the media, the special
interest, the lobbyists, the donors, they're all against me. I'm self-funding my campaign. I don't
owe anybody anything. I only owe it to the American people to do a great job. They are really
trying to stop me” (Judis 72). This was the admittedly smart workaround for the contradiction of
a billionaire running against the elite: in a system where money is everything, a man with
everything can’t be bought. His strategy worked, and “his nastiness - seen as defying standards of
political correctness - combined with his substantive appeals on trade, immigration, and runaway
shops, tapped into a vein of support among Republicans and independents” (Judis 74). Just who
were his supporters, though? Who comprised the “silent majority”?
Throughout his run, Trump’s criticisms of Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism drove a
wedge between the Republican coalition of the party's business interests and white working- and
middle-class voters (Judis 74). In his criticisms, Judis claims, “He had become the voice of middle
American radicalism and more broadly of the white Americans who felt left behind by
globalization and the shift to a post-industrial economy” (Judis 74). Trump’s appeals were
intended for an audience primed to rebel against Neoliberal globalization. Looking at demographic
and polling data among those who comprised the “silent majority” can give some insight into why
he was so attractive to some and whether that attraction was related to anti-Globalist sentiments in
the electorate that formed his base.
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Again, citing the ANES and Pew polls utilized for examining Sanders’ supporters, Judis
works to understand Trump’s voter base. In the ANES poll, Judis found that Trump supporters
were proportionally older and less well educated than those of other candidates: 70.1% of Trump
supporters were not college graduates and half of his voters made less than $50000 a year (Judis
75). In this segment of Trump’s base, Judis saw the descendants of white working-class voters
who had fled the Democratic party in the 1960s after their embrace of the civil rights movement.
Judis contends that “already alienated from Washington and the changes they had seen around
them in 1972, they had become even more so in 2016, as the Great Recession seemed like the final
blow to their economic prospects in an economy that disproportionately favored the upper middle
class and very rich” (Judis 75). The ANES poll, for example, showed that 48% of Trump’s voters
thought that economic conditions were poor, making them the most pessimistic set of voters in the
2016 election (Judis 76). 61%, according to the Pew poll, thought the U.S. economic system
unfairly favored the powerful. As additional support for this idea, Judis offers an anecdotal account
alleging that supporters at Trump’s rallies “invariably” referenced his self-financing as a major
factor in their support for him (Judis 76). On the subject of trade, the Pew report showed that 67%
of Trump supporters thought of free trade agreements as bad for the U.S. (Judis 76). When it came
to the subject of benefits, 73% opposed any reduction in Social Security while a majority opposed
benefits like Obamacare that they viewed as benefitting the poor, a position that mirrored that of
the Tea Party (Judis 77). Judis contends that Trump’s message fit the bill of “middle American
Populism”, a kind of ideology that is skeptical of both the powers above and below (Judis 76).
Such economic pessimism mirrors some of the beliefs of Sanders’ voters, but while economics
was the main draw for Sanders’ voters, the picture is more complicated for Trump voters.
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The Oliver and Rahn study of Trump supporters, for example, found that they scored
highest for “mistrust of elites” and “national affiliation” and second highest (among the field of
primary candidates) for “political marginalization” (Oliver and Rahn 199). Additionally, Trump
voters were found to feel the most socially alienated and harbor the strongest nativist sentiments.
Though the data does indicate serious pessimism about their financial futures, linking their beliefs
somewhat to the Tea Party, the most significant and important finding was that Trump supporters
feared immigrants the most of any base of support, a reality that highlights Oliver and Rahn’s
findings about nativism amongst Trump supporters (Oliver and Rahn 201). Returning to Judis’
figures, the ANES study showed that 66.4% opposed birthright citizenship for immigrants born in
the U.S. (Judis 76). The Pew study also showed that some 69% thought of immigrants as a burden
on the country (Judis 76). The 2015 PRRI report provides additional insight into the identity of
Trump supporters. In their report, some 69% of Trump supporters saw immigration as personally
important, compared with only 50% of the GOP overall (Cooper et al. 2015). 80% of Trump
supporters thought of immigrants as a burden because they take American jobs, housing, and
healthcare. 73% said that they are bothered when they come into contact with immigrants that
speak little or no English. The PRRI report compares these figures to Republican party voters
overall, who still responded in the majority to these questions (56% and 58% respectively) but
were not nearly as convinced of the negatives of immigrants (Cooper et al. 2015).
While these statistics are illuminating, it is again important to temper them with the
understanding that they might be more indicative of the candidate that these voters support than
the actual views of those voters. In order to test the legitimacy of the data, then, I employ the same
tactic used for examining support for Bernie Sanders. Demographic data from Pew Research
Center is again the method employed. In this case, the data can be relied upon to be more definitive,
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as this 2018 study was able to cross-reference validated voters to ensure that reports were accurate
based on how voters actually ended up casting their ballots.
There are several interesting findings from this study. First, 30% of validated voters in
2016 were whites with a four-year college degree education or greater (“An Examination” 2018).
Of that set, 55% went for Clinton and 38% voted Trump. 44% of validated voters were whites who
had not completed college, a set of voters that Trump won 64% to Clinton’s 28%. These statistics
confirm Judis’ assertion that Trump’s voters were proportionally whiter and less educated. There
are two important takeaways from this. First, lower levels of education, as Bullock’s 2011 study
showed, tend to mean that voters define their views more by the party elite that they follow than
by any other heuristic. This might suggest that this defining characteristic of Trump’s voter
demographics doesn’t necessarily lend any credence to the idea that the aforementioned polling
data is especially trustworthy and legitimate. While this does mean that a different measure needs
to be explored to be certain of the legitimacy of the polling data, there is one more important point
to make about this set of data. A 2003 study published in the journal Political Psychology entitled
“The Effect of Education on Nationalism and Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison”
from authors Marcel Coenders and Peer Scheepers highlights the reality that uneducated voters
tend to rank higher in feelings of nationalism, suggesting that this demographic characteristic
might actually correlate to the kind of nationalistic sentiment driving support for an anti-Globalist
Populist. To be sure, though, I need to examine more demographic data and see whether there is a
more certain connection.
The next best place to look in the demographic data is in the age breakdown. In contrast to
Sanders, Trump’s voters appear proportionally older. In 2016, 13% of validated voters were
younger than 30, and Clinton won this demographic 58% to 28% (“An Examination” 2018). Of
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voters 50-64, Trump won 51% to 45%. From voters 65 and older, Trump won 53% to 44%. There
does appear to be a trend of higher support for Trump among older voters, so it seems that age is
a good defining characteristic to examine to determine the legitimacy of the polling data. So, is
there any research that suggests that older voters might be primed for anti-Globalist Populist
messaging? In fact, it looks as though there may be.
A 2016 article titled “Aging, Trade, and Migration”, from Chisik et al. suggests that older
voters tend to be more susceptible to nationalistic views. Additionally, they find that this kind of
nationalism leads to isolationist trade policy and can reinforce the views of those anti-Globalists.
Effectively, they find a tangible link between aging and nationalism and relate that to anti-Globalist
sentiment. This is enough to show that age is an appropriate demographic factor to determine
whether the polling data provided represents the legitimate views of the voters or not. Given the
findings of Chisik et al..’s study, it appears as though the hypothesis is supported. Trump voters
were in fact especially primed for anti-Globalist Populist messaging, lending support to the
assertions of Judis, Harvey, and Barrett.
The essence of all these findings is that Trump’s voters responded to a myriad of antiNeoliberal issues, usually from a rather self-centered perspective. Their isolationist and nativist
views, as well as their anti-immigrant views, coincide with upward trends in nativism and
isolationism previously discussed in the “Global Capitalism and Nativism” sub-section of “Key
Issues and Variables”. In this regard, Trump’s message and his supporters’ beliefs seem to follow
the trend of anti-Neoliberal sentiment as outlined. Trump’s obvious Populism then appears
inextricably linked to his anti-Neoliberal rhetoric, at least when examining his campaign for the
office of the President of the United States.
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Neoliberalism and America into the Future
Writing in 2005, before the rise of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street Populist
movements, Harvey predicted a growing anti-Neoliberal backlash on the horizon:
… It is not clear either that the mass of the working people in the US, who have over this
last generation often willingly voted against their own material interests for reasons of
cultural nationalism, religion, and moral values, will forever stay locked into such a politics
by the machinations of Republicans and Democrats alike. Given the volatility, there is no
reason to rule out the resurgence of popular social democratic or even populist antineoliberal politics within the US in future years. (Harvey 199) [Emphasis mine.]
It is rather impressive the degree to which Harvey’s evaluation came true. Harvey, Barrett,
and Judis would have argued that Populist backlash, as seen in 2016, would mean the death knell
of Neoliberalism, an ideology that, in their telling, may have always been inevitably short-lived.
Harvey points out, for example, several glaring and exploitable contradictions within the
Neoliberal agenda. For one, Harvey argues, the widening gap between the rhetoric of Neoliberals
(“for the benefit of all”) and the realization of the agenda (“the benefit of a small ruling class”) has
become, through the rise of such consequences as massive wealth and income inequality, “all too
visible” (Harvey 203). Additionally, “the idea that the market is about competition and fairness is
increasingly negated by the fact of the extraordinary monopolization, centralization, and
internationalization of corporate and financial power” (Harvey 203). In Harvey’s view, “The more
neoliberalism is recognized as a failed utopian rhetoric masking a successful project for the
restoration of ruling-class power, the more the basis is laid for a resurgence of mass movements
voicing egalitarian political demands and seeking economic justice, fair trade, and greater
economic security” (Harvey 203-204). If Harvey is to be believed, then the Populism of 2016 may
have been just the beginning of the end.
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Populism is, as a rhetorical framework, ever-present as an undercurrent in the American
psyche. It is unrealistic to expect it to simply go away. That reality, then, means that we should
take time to understand what it means for our society. Writing for the Guardian in 2018, James
Miller makes the case in “Could Populism Actually be Good for Democracy?” that it is, in
actuality, a useful check on Democracy. In his argumentation, Populist movements, designed to
reclaim wealth and political power in modern democracies, “are essential to the vitality, and
viability, of modern democracy - even as (and precisely because) they challenge the status quo,
destructive though that challenge may be” (Miller 2018). The premise for his argument is that, for
all its trouble, Populism is a useful tool precisely because of the urgency that it forces upon us.
Populism points us in the direction of our failures, holds us down, and forces us to look.
I take some issue with this exact line of argumentation. As a narrative framework, Populism
cannot necessarily be understood as a “check”; Populism is opportunistic and frequently exclusive.
That said, there is some value in his idea. As exclusive as the narrative often is, Populists do claim
to speak for the people. When they enjoy significant success, as Donald Trump did, it is a good
indication that the people might have some concerns that they want addressed. So, when Populists
come along, disingenuous, opportunistic claims and all, and tell us to look, regardless of where
they are pointing, we must be equipped to examine the crisis that allowed them that platform in
the first place. And, despite the character of many who cynically seize the helm of Populism in
often vain attempts to achieve power, the people on the ground who make up the base of support
for Populists have genuine concerns that they want answered. Perhaps it is better, then, to consider
the rise of Populists as “focusing events” rather than explicit check on democracy. In this telling,
Populists can still be understood to be a marginal and often dangerous entity but can still be treated
as something that needs to be attended to.
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Though not all Populist movements can be cast in such a positive light, Barrett concludes
his book on a similar, more hopeful sentiment: “The people who continue to struggle for a more
humane world, despite their chances and the risk of violence, may seem naïve, but they continue
fighting because they know what they will get otherwise - a continuation of the unacceptable. They
fight. They defy. They disrupt. They demand the impossible, and they seek the unattainable. And
they do so, like those before them, to avoid the unimaginable” (Barrett 163). It is naïve to believe
that Populist support will dissipate after defeat, leaving the world to slide back comfortably into
its state of normalcy. If there’s one thing that Barrett’s book outlines, it is the tenacity of righteous
activists and the will of those who believe in a cause.
The results of this paper suggest that Harvey, Barrett, and Judis are right in acknowledging
Neoliberalism as a driving force behind these Populist messages. Polling data, as related to the key
issues and variables outlined throughout this paper, suggests that many are unwilling to maintain
the status quo. When examining the issues of income inequality and global Neoliberalization, the
trends are clear: voters feel underrepresented and disproportionately bear the consequences of the
decisions of economic and political elites. The results of this paper suggest that one crisis that
Populists have been pointing to, as Barrett and Judis have argued, has been Neoliberalism. In the
Populists’ opportunism, they betray an honest depiction of the hardships that average Americans
face, and bring light to issues that have long been ignored.
Other than this take away, there are a few key points that need to be made. First, this paper
does not comprehensively examine the issues presented by Neoliberalism. For example, the
passage of Obamacare was briefly touched on, but an examination of the nuance of the way in
which it forced consumers into the hands of private insurers was foregone in favor of other issues.
I also neglected to examine the effects of Neoliberalism on the environment (through the
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deregulation of corporations and the establishment of unregulated free trade zones where such
externalities are all but ignored) and the extremely strong wave of protests that arose in response
to it, as outlined extensively throughout Dawson Barrett’s book. Additionally, as mentioned, I
decided against a discussion of the effects of the Great Recession and rise of corporate lobbying
for clarity and brevity, but these issues are surely worth examining in the narrative of the rise of
Populism. There are also some other factors that future research should take into account when
examining popular opinion. I think, for instance, that Oliver and Rahn’s assertion that increasing
media coverage of income inequality led to stronger feelings about it in opinion polling suggests
that the role of the media and the coverage of certain issues should be studied as it relates to
Populism. Perhaps such a Populist backlash as the massive outpouring of support for Sanders’
campaign, which was run primarily on the issue of inequality, could have come sooner if the issue
had been brought to national prominence sooner (the upticks in concern over the issue that
correlated with the rise of OWS, as outlined earlier in the paper from Kenworthy and Owens, also
indicates that movements can fill this role and bring issues to prominence). Future research should
also concern itself with the effect of the global migrant crisis, the advent of fake news, Russian
interference in elections around the world, and growing racial tensions around the world on the
rise of Populism. As I discussed in my introduction, I think that fake news may be a marginal
variable, but as more information is available, it may be an interesting confounding variable to
throw into the mix in order to see if Populists may have had the same appeal without it.
This paper does not comprehensively examine all the factors in the success of Populists in
2016. While I treat Neoliberalism as an important piece of the puzzle, it is just a piece of the
puzzle. Why was 2016 the year that tensions spilled over into Populist pushback? What was
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different about 2016 that allowed a nativist Populist like Trump to seize the presidency? These
questions should direct further research on the subject.
I believe that the evidence in this paper, though, is sufficient to show that the hypothesis
that Neoliberalism was a crisis that Populists were responding to does not fail when held up to
empirical testing. Though I think there are other variables worth consideration, I think a good
number of them may have relationships with Neoliberalism anyway. For example, an examination
of the media would surely have to come up against such questions as why it covers what it does.
While not entirely the answer, the media, especially in the U.S., is run as a business, with vested
interests in profit. In some cases, stakeholders get significant voice in what the organization gets
to portray. For example, in 2016, the U.S. saw the largest prison strike in history (Speri 2016).
Despite the scope of the protest, few major news sources carried the story. Looking more closely,
organizations like ABC and NBC had parent companies with ties to the Corrections Corporation
of America – the largest for-profit prison corporation in America – and similar groups who had a
vested interest in a certain silence on the issue. An examination of the role of the media in the rise
of Populism would surely have to reconcile with the corporate side of the media, a task which
would mean grappling with the relationship between profit and coverage.
Populism is an ugly, unkind thing that transforms and bastardizes the concerns of citizens,
but it is a useful tool. So long as the tradition continues, we should heed its warnings and take the
time for the introspection necessary to understand when we have gone wrong. The premise of the
hypothesis in this paper is that that crisis that Populists were pointing to was the ideology of
Neoliberalism. With that understanding, we should take the time to have a healthy conversation
about reform. Now is the time to figure out what our future will look like. If the results of the last
election cycle are any indication, we may want to consider a new path forward.
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